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FRAUD CREATED THE MARKET: PRESUMING
RELIANCE IN RULE 10B-5 PRIMARY SECURITIES
MARKET FRAUD LITIGATION
Matt Silverman *
This Note addresses the circuit split regarding the “fraud created the
market” presumption of reliance in Rule 10b-5 securities fraud cases.
Fraud created the market was first adopted by the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit in Shores v. Sklar, and applies in cases where a defendant
has engaged in a “scheme to defraud” the investing public in the primary
securities market.
This Note first discusses Congress’s intent behind relevant securities
laws, the effect presuming reliance has on the class certification process,
and how the presumption of reliance has been applied in Rule 10b-5
actions by the U.S. Supreme Court. Next, this Note analyzes the initial
acceptance of the fraud created the market theory in Shores, and the split
between the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Fifth, Tenth, and Eleventh
Circuits, which have accepted the theory, and the U.S. Courts of Appeals
for the Third and Seventh Circuits, which have rejected the theory. Finally,
this Note argues that the Fifth Circuit’s unique interpretation of what
constitutes a “scheme to defraud” in Abell v. Potomac Insurance Co. is
consistent with congressional intent, urging its acceptance by the Supreme
Court so that investors may have reliance presumed in the primary market.
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INTRODUCTION
When we deal with private actions under Rule 10b-5, we deal with a
judicial oak which has grown from little more than a legislative acorn. . . .
It is therefore proper that we consider . . . what may be described as
policy considerations when we come to flesh out the portions of the law
with respect to which neither the congressional enactment nor the
administrative regulations offer conclusive guidance. 1

The question of how far securities law should extend to protect investors
from fraud has divided courts for more than seventy years. Currently,
circuit courts are struggling with whether a presumption of reliance should
extend to plaintiffs who seek to recover under section 10(b) 2 of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 3 (Exchange Act) in Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) Rule 10b-5 actions, 4 when fraudulent
misrepresentations or omissions were made during the process of offering
the security to the public in the primary market. 5
1. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975).
2. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006).
3. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78kk (Exchange Act). See
generally LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 37–39
(4th ed. 2001) (providing overview of the Exchange Act).
4. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2010).
5. See infra Part I.A.2.
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In general, the securities market can be divided into the primary and
secondary markets. 6 The primary market consists of securities, such as
stocks and bonds, which enter the market for the first time through initial
offerings and distributions. 7 Once distributed, the securities enter the
secondary market, where they are traded between different parties on stock
exchanges and over-the-counter markets. 8 Although the U.S. Supreme
Court in Basic Inc. v. Levinson 9 held that reliance under “fraud on the
market” theory (FOTM) could be presumed in actions concerning securities
trading in efficient secondary markets, 10 the Court has not recognized a
presumption for efficient or inefficient primary markets. The U.S. Courts
of Appeals for the Fifth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have adopted some
form of “fraud created the market” theory (FCTM), 11 which extends the
presumption of reliance to plaintiffs who were defrauded when purchasing
newly issued securities. 12 Shores v. Sklar 13 was the first case to adopt
FCTM. 14 It extended the presumption to primary market investors who
relied on the “integrity of the market” to filter out fraudulent securities
because “governments would not authorize, underwriters would not finance
and brokers would not offer to sell bonds they knew were unmarketable.” 15
Circuit courts accepting FCTM consider a security to be unmarketable
(or “not entitled to be marketed”) 16 when the defendants have engaged in a
scheme to defraud the investing public 17 and but for the fraud, the security
could not have been sold on the market at any price. 18 This scheme to

6. See 1 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION
§ 1.1[4] (5th ed. 2009).
7. See id.
8. See id.
9. 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
10. See infra Part I.A.6.a.
11. See Ross v. Bank S., N.A., 885 F.2d 723 (11th Cir. 1989); T.J. Raney & Sons, Inc. v.
Fort Cobb, Okl. Irrigation Fuel Auth., 717 F.2d 1330 (10th Cir. 1983); Shores v. Sklar, 647
F.2d 462 (5th Cir. May 1981).
12. See infra Part I.A.7. Commentators have argued that the theory is baseless because
it does not rest on economic theory. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller,
Good Finance, Bad Economics: An Analysis of the Fraud-on-the-Market Theory, 42 STAN.
L. REV. 1059, 1060 n.5 (1990) (criticizing the Shores decision as unsupported by economic
theory).
13. 647 F.2d at 469–70.
14. See Julie A. Herzog, Fraud Created the Market: An Unwise and Unwarranted
Extension of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 359, 374 (1995)
(commenting that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Shores “set sail in new
waters” by adopting this presumption of reliance).
15. Ockerman v. May Zima & Co., 27 F.3d 1151, 1159–60 (6th Cir. 1994); see infra
Part I.A.7.
16. Shores, 647 F.2d at 469.
17. See infra Parts I.A.7, II.A.
18. See infra Part I.A.7; see also Client Alert, Chadbourne & Park LLP, “Fraud Created
the Market” Securities Fraud Theory Rejected by the Third Circuit, Widening Circuit Split,
2–3 (Aug. 25, 2010), available at http://www.chadbourne.com/files/Publication/656f99923826-4c25-ace3-33ede8de9f6e/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/346251ae-732d-448c83be-38c239759986/Security%20Lit-%20Fraud%20Created%20Market%20ca.pdf; Peter J.
Dennin, Note, Which Came First, The Fraud or the Market: Is the Fraud-Created-the-
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defraud must be “so pervasive that it goes to the very existence of the
[securities] and the validity of their presence on the market.” 19 If the
security is found to be unmarketable then the investor must show reliance
on the integrity of the market, and that the investor was injured by the
fraud. 20 Circuit courts have diverged on whether unmarketable means
“economic unmarketability” or “legal unmarketability.” 21
Economic unmarketability focuses on whether the securities could have
been sold on the market at any price “if the true risk . . . had been
known.” 22 The Fifth Circuit has interpreted this to mean that the security is
unmarketable if the business the security is purported to support is a
The Eleventh Circuit also uses a form of economic
sham. 23
unmarketability. It applies FCTM when the security is patently worthless,
defining this to mean that the security must have no underlying value (i.e.
not backed by any assets or functioning business). 24 Legal unmarketability
determines unmarketability by looking to see “if, absent fraud, a regulatory
agency or the issuing municipality would have been required by law to
prevent or forbid the issuance of the security.” 25 Circuits justify FCTM and
these different theories of unmarketability with two main arguments.26
First, FCTM allows courts to better combat fraud. Second, FCTM is
consistent with the purposes of securities regulation.27 Specifically, FCTM
seeks to protect investors and promote open markets by punishing fraud and
mandating disclosure in securities markets.28
Two circuit courts have rejected FCTM.29 Most recently, in Malack v.
BDO Seidman, LLP, 30 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
summarized and expanded upon the many criticisms of FCTM.31 The

Market Valid Under Rule 10b-5?, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 2611, 2612 (2001) (stating that
“‘[u]nmarketable’ securities are those issued only because of the issuer’s fraud”).
19. Ross v. Bank S., N.A., 885 F.2d 723, 729 (11th Cir. 1989).
20. See infra Part II.A.1–II.A.3.
21. See Dennin, supra note 18, at 2625 (discussing the different theories of fraud created
the market (“FCTM”)).
22. Ross, 885 F.2d at 736 (Tjoflat, J., concurring).
23. See infra Part II.A.1.
24. See infra Part II.A.2.
25. Ockerman v. May Zima & Co., 27 F.3d 1151, 1160 (6th Cir. 1994) (explaining the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit’s legally unmarketable standard); see infra Part
II.A.3.
26. See infra Parts I.A.7, II.A, III.A.
27. See infra Parts I.A.7, II.A, III.A.
28. See infra Parts I.A.1–I.A.2, I.A.7, II.A, III.A (describing the purposes of different
securities regulations as promoting disclosure, preventing fraud, and limiting unnecessary
liability).
29. The U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Seventh and Third Circuits have rejected FCTM.
See infra Part II.B.1–II.B.2. Meanwhile the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Sixth, Eighth,
and Ninth Circuits have neither rejected nor accepted the theory. See generally Desai v.
Deutsche Bank Sec. Ltd., 573 F.3d 931 (9th Cir. 2009); In re NationsMart Corp. Sec. Litig.,
130 F.3d 309 (8th Cir. 1997); Ockerman, 27 F.3d at 1151.
30. 617 F.3d 743 (3d Cir. 2010).
31. Id. at 756 (concluding that FCTM was baseless, and that it does not have firm
theoretical or judicial support); see infra Part II.B.2.

2011]

FRAUD CREATED THE MARKET

1791

Malack court called FCTM a form of investor insurance 32 inconsistent with
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA), 33 contrary
to the Exchange Act’s purpose, 34 and implicitly rejected by the Supreme
Court in Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc. 35
Stoneridge did not explicitly mention FCTM; however, to be consistent
with the PSLRA, the opinion asserted that any expansion of Rule 10b-5
private actions, including the reliance element, should be left to Congress.36
The PSLRA was passed to decrease the number of strike suits 37 filed
against companies whose securities dropped in value, whether or not fraud
was involved. 38 Accordingly, the Malack opinion stated that FCTM
undermines the PSLRA 39 because the presumption of reliance causes
defendants “to settle early and often to avoid litigation costs and the risk of
getting hit with a large verdict at trial,”40 which makes frivolous lawsuits
more burdensome. 41 In interpreting Congress’s intent behind the PSLRA,
the Stoneridge Court viewed the PSLRA as authorization by Congress to
further narrow and limit the contours of Rule 10b-5’s private action and, at

32. Malack, 617 F.3d at 752. Critics argue that investor insurance is created when
reliance is presumed in inefficient primary markets because it makes investors believe they
will be able to recover anytime they make a bad investment and, therefore, investors will not
read the offering materials. See infra notes 218–21, 303 and accompanying text.
33. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 15 U.S.C.).
34. See Malack, 617 F.3d at 752 (commenting that Congress purposely left certain
injuries without remedy and that it did not intend to regulate the merits of “various
investments”).
35. See Id. at 753–55 (stating that whether or not the action is extended should be left to
Congress and “the § 10(b) private right should not be extended beyond its present
boundaries” (quoting Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148,
165 (2008))); see also Desai v. Deutsche Bank Sec. Ltd., 573 F.3d 931, 942 (9th Cir. 2009)
(finding that the U.S. Supreme Court “adopted a rather restrictive view of private suits under
§ 10(b)”).
36. Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 165–66; see infra II.B.2.
37. Strike suits are frivolous lawsuits filed by lawyers looking to extract a settlement
from defendants who want to avoid the costs of litigation. S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 4 (1995),
reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 683 (describing that the purpose of the PSLRA was to
prevent these types of suits); see also Michael B. Dunn, Note, Pleading Scienter After the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act: Or, a Textualist Revenge, 84 CORNELL L. REV 193,
196 n.11 (1998) (stating that the PSLRA was “designed to thwart the strike suit at every
stage of litigation”); infra notes 83, 308 and accompanying text.
38. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(6) (2006) (limiting the awards of class plaintiffs’
attorneys’ fees to a “reasonable percentage”); H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 31, 37 (1995)
(Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 730, 736 (seeking to end “manipulation
by class action lawyers” and “frivolous securities class actions”); see also Evan Hill, Note,
The Rule 10b-5 Suit: Loss Causation Pleading Standards in Private Securities Fraud
Claims After Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2659, 2671–72
(2010) (discussing the frequency with which strike suits were filed due to the low bar a
plaintiff’s lawyer needed to overcome in order to extract settlements).
39. See infra note 308 and accompanying text.
40. Malack, 617 F.3d at 755; see infra Part I.A.4.
41. Malack, 617 F.3d at 755 (finding that these costs “infect the function of the entire
securities market” by increasing the risks and costs of bringing securities onto the market).
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least, to prevent any expansion.42 Malack points out that the “[a]doption of
[FCTM] would extend § 10(b) liability far beyond its current contours.” 43
This Note analyzes the development, application, and rejection of FCTM
in the circuit courts. It focuses on whether or not the presumption is
supported by Congress’s intent in passing the securities laws and if it
should be incorporated into Rule 10b-5 actions dealing with newly issued
securities. This Note contends that the Supreme Court should address
FCTM and embrace the theory because it broadens the presumption of
reliance without imposing burdensome liability on defendants who issue
securities in good faith.44 FCTM promotes disclosure by securities issuers,
protects primary market investors, deters fraud, and punishes fraudsters, all
of which are consistent with federal securities law.45 Embracing the FCTM
exception would lead to a more honest primary market, and would not
create the type of investor insurance and frivolous lawsuits that many critics
foresee as a byproduct of FCTM’s adoption. 46
Part I of this Note explains the adoption of the Securities Act of 1933
(Securities Act) and the Exchange Act, the judicial development of private
causes of action under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, including the
evolution of the presumption of reliance under Basic and Affiliated Ute
Citizens of Utah v. United States, 47 and the subsequent adoption of FCTM
under Shores. Part II addresses the circuit court split regarding FCTM,
focusing on the variations adopted by the circuits and the reasons for its
rejection by other circuits. Finally, Part III advocates embracing a modified
version of Shores to promote investor protections that are consistent with
the PSLRA, the Exchange Act, and common sense.
I. THE PRESUMPTION OF RELIANCE IN PRIVATE RULE 10B-5 ACTIONS
This part addresses the judicial development and importance of the
presumption of reliance under Rule 10b-5 in the Supreme Court. This part
first lays out the Securities Act and Exchange Act and their purpose. Next,
it discusses in general why courts choose to adopt presumptions in court
proceedings, and specifically how the presumption of reliance can affect the
outcome of a Rule 10b-5 action during the class certification process. This
Note then surveys the application of this presumption of reliance to
42. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 165 (2008)
(“Congress . . . ratified the implied right of action after the [Supreme] Court moved away
from a broad willingness to imply private rights of action.”); see Thomas O. Gorman, Third
Circuit Rejects “Fraud-Created-the-Market” Theory, SEC ACTIONS, (Aug. 18, 2010, 2:47
AM), http://www.secactions.com/?p=2496 (discussing how FCTM is “contrary to the
teachings of Stoneridge which cautioned against expansive readings of the reliance
requirement, particularly in view of the fact that the cause of action under Section 10(b) has
been crafted by the courts, not Congress”).
43. Malack, 617 F.3d at 754.
44. See infra Part III.A.
45. See infra Part III.A.
46. See infra Part III.A; see also Dennin, supra note 18, at 2614 (stating that FCTM is
both “valid and necessary” and “provides investors with a flexible mechanism for combating
securities fraud”).
47. 406 U.S. 128, 153–54 (1972).
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fraudulent omissions of material information under Affiliated Ute and
Basic, which expanded the presumption to efficient secondary markets
under FOTM when there have been material misrepresentations and
omissions. Part I concludes by analyzing the Shores decision and the Fifth
Circuit’s adoption of FCTM.
A. Private Causes of Action Under the Securities Act of 1933 and the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934
Following the Great Depression of 1929, Congress enacted the Securities
Act 48 and the Exchange Act 49 to protect investors from unfair market
manipulation and rid the securities market of its former philosophy of
caveat emptor.50 As President Franklin D. Roosevelt stated, the new
regulatory scheme put “the burden of telling the whole truth on the seller
. . . [and provided an] impetus to honest dealing” in the securities markets.51
In other words, the purpose of the Acts was, and still is, to prevent fraud
and create full disclosure in the markets so investors can make informed
decisions on their own. 52 To this end, the Securities Act regulates the
initial public offering (IPO) of securities 53 sold in the primary market.54
The Exchange Act governs securities that have already been offered and
sold to the public and are traded in secondary markets, such as stock
Both Acts require that companies disclose material
exchanges. 55
information regarding the security. 56 Under the Securities Act, companies
make these disclosures in their securities’ registration statement and

48. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa (2006) (Securities Act).
49. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b); Steve Thel, The Original Conception of Section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act, 42 STAN. L. REV. 385, 408 (1990) (describing the process leading
to its enactment).
50. S. REP. NO. 73-792, at 1–5 (1934); see Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate
Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 171 (1994); see also Hill, supra note 38, at 2665–66
(describing the circumstances leading to the stock market crash of 1929 and the purpose of
the Acts).
51. H.R. REP. 73-85, at 2 (1933).
52. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the
Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669, 669 (1984) (stating that securities law has “two
basic components: a prohibition against fraud, and requirements of disclosure when
securities are issued and periodically thereafter”).
53. Securities are financial instruments that represent rights in something else, like a
piece of a corporation or a debt. See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (2006). An initial public offering
is when the securities are first offered for sale to the public. See HAZEN, supra note 6, § 1.1.
54. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976) (stating that the
Securities Act “was designed to provide investors with full disclosure of material
information concerning public offerings”); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421
U.S. 723, 752 (1975) (finding that the Securities Act’s primary purpose was to increase
disclosure in the context of “initial distributions of newly issued stock”). Under the
Securities Act, issuers are responsible for registering the securities with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) and disclosing material information within the registration
statement and prospectus. HAZEN, supra note 6, § 2.0. A prospectus is any “document that
describes a public offering of securities by an issuer or controlling shareholder.” Gustafson
v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 584 (1995).
55. See HAZEN, supra note 6, § 1.1[4].
56. Id. § 12.4.
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offering materials (such as a prospectus), 57 which are distributed to
investors during an IPO. The Exchange Act requires public companies to
release information periodically in accordance with the regulatory
framework. 58 To monitor compliance with these regulations and enforce
the rules promulgated under the Acts, Congress created the SEC in 1934.59
The SEC plays an active role in regulating securities sold for the first time
on the primary market and traded in the secondary market. 60 Additionally,
each Act provides private plaintiffs the right to bring actions against actors
who fraudulently misrepresent or omit material information to investors.61
This private liability is meant to allow investors to “safely buy and sell
securities upon the exchanges” and to prevent fraudulent practices that
hinder “the operation of the markets.” 62
1. The Securities Act
The Securities Act allows private causes of action, in part, to prevent
fraud in the primary market and to “promote ethical standards of honesty
and fair dealing.” 63 In furtherance of this goal the Securities Act covers a
myriad of securities and establishes a low threshold for liability under the
Act. 64 Sections 11 and 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act create private
remedies for negligent conduct leading to misstatements or omissions in a
registration statement or prospectus.65 This negligence standard has been
interpreted to mean that liability is “virtually absolute, even for innocent
misstatements” concerning the securities and parties covered by the Act. 66

57. Registration statements include disclosures made mandatory by the Securities Act
and, absent an exemption, must be issued in order for a security to be legally sold. HAZEN,
supra note 6, § 2.2[1](a); see infra notes 67–71 and accompanying text. Registration
prospectuses generally encapsulate information that would be useful to the average investor.
Eckstein v. Balcor Film Invs., 58 F.3d 1162, 1168–69 (7th Cir. 1995); see also 15 U.S.C.
§ 77b(a)(10) (providing the statutory definition).
58. HAZEN, supra note 6, § 2.0.
59. 15
U.S.C.
§
78d;
see
U.S.
SEC.
&
EXCHANGE
COMM’N,
http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (last visited Feb. 23, 2011).
60. See 15 U.S.C. § 78f.
61. See, e.g., HAZEN, supra note 6, § 12.4.
62. H.R. REP. NO. 73-1383, at 11 (1934).
63. Ballay v. Legg Mason Wood Walker, Inc., 925 F.2d 682, 690 (3d Cir. 1991) (stating
that Congress designed the Act to increase disclosure through requiring registration and
punishing fraud (citing Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 196 (1976))).
64. Id. at 690–92.
65. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k(a), 77l(a)(2). In order to have a private cause of action, section 11
requires plaintiffs to show that they purchased a registered security and that “any part of the
registration statement [or prospectus] contained an untrue statement of a material fact or
omitted to state a material fact required to be stated therein.” Id. § 77k(a). Some courts have
also interpreted section 17(a) as creating a private cause of action. See Thomas L. Hazen, A
Look Beyond the Pruning of Rule 10b-5: Implied Remedies and Section 17(a) of the
Securities Act of 1933, 64 VA. L. REV. 641, 642–43 (1978) (discussing how section 17(a) is
interpreted by courts as creating a private cause of action).
66. Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 382 (1983); see infra, notes 81–
82 and accompanying text (explaining that scienter, meaning knowledge or recklessness, is
required under Rule 10b-5).
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Although the Act is expansive, it does have limitations. First, section
3(a)(2) provides a list of securities that are exempt from the Act, including
securities issued by state, local, and federal governments, 67 such as
municipal 68 and industrial revenue bonds.69 Second, certain corporate
officers are exempt from liability under the Securities Act.70 Therefore,
investors who lose money due to misrepresentations in the primary
industrial revenue and municipal bond markets have no recourse under the
Act and must seek recovery through other channels like Rule 10b-5 of the
Exchange Act. 71
2. The Exchange Act
Section 10(b) 72 is the “catchall provision” of the Exchange Act.73 It
provides plaintiffs with a cause of action against defendants who use
manipulative or deceptive practices in regulated securities disclosures.74
Promulgated under section 10(b), SEC Rule 10b-5 75 is the primary means
for recovery in a fraud action under the Exchange Act.76 Rule 10b-5
identifies the following unlawful manipulative and deceptive practices:

67. See 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a); HAZEN, supra note 6, § 4.3.
68. See 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(2). Municipal bonds are exempt because generally they are
guaranteed by the government. HAZEN, supra note 6, § 4.3.[1][a] nn.4–5.
69. SEC Rule 131(b) explains this exemption, providing that an industrial revenue bond
issued by a government, but payable by a private party, is exempt if the debt obligation
relates to a public project. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.131(b) (2010).
70. Actions cannot be brought against certain corporate officers, lawyers, and
accountants unless specifically mentioned within the statute. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b); see
also Herman & MacLean, 459 U.S. at 386 n.22 (describing how plaintiffs were barred from
bringing an action under the Securities Act because the defendants were exempt).
71. Many of the key cases where plaintiffs have argued for FCTM involved
misrepresentations made in the offering materials of municipal and industrial revenue bonds.
See, e.g., Ockerman v. May Zima & Co., 27 F.3d 1151, 1151–53 (6th Cir. 1994); Abell v.
Potomac Ins. Co., 858 F.2d 1104, 1120–22 (5th Cir. 1988); Shores v. Sklar, 647 F.2d 462,
463–65 (5th Cir. 1981). At least one commentator has suggested that in Shores and similar
decisions involving municipal bonds, plaintiffs “should be entitled to some minimal
assurance that the market offers protection against sham investments,” but that “the best way
of providing for this would be for legislative enactment of an explicit remedy for purchasers
of revenue bonds comparable to section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933.” Barbara Black,
The Strange Case of Fraud on the Market: A Label in Search of a Theory, 52 ALB. L. REV.
923, 955 (1988).
72. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b).
73. See, e.g., Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 234–35 (1980) (stating that
“[s]ection 10(b) is aptly described as a catchall provision, but what it catches must be
fraud”).
74. See id.; see also Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 206 (1976).
75. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2010). In 1942, the SEC created Rule 10b-5 in accordance
with section 10(b) of the Exchange Act. Since Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp.
512 (E.D. Pa. 1946), the courts have created and upheld a private cause of action through a
process of judicial interpretation and congressional inaction. See Herman & MacLean, 459
U.S. at 380 n.10, for a summary of the evolution and then recognition of the private cause of
action by the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S.
723, 730 (1975) (affirming that a private action had been consistently recognized).
76. See, e.g., Symposium, Happy Birthday 10b-5: 50 Years of Antifraud Regulation, 61
FORDHAM L. REV. S1 (1993).
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(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of
the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security. 77

The Supreme Court has recognized that 10b-5(b) extends to securities in
the primary market context, 78 including securities that are exempt from the
Securities and Exchange Acts. 79 The private cause of action for
misrepresentation under Rule 10b-5(b) tracks the common law tort of deceit
and misrepresentation, also known as fraud. 80 In order to recover, a
plaintiff must show: (1) a material misrepresentation, (2) scienter, (3) a
connection with the purchase or sale of a security, (4) reliance, (5)
economic loss, and (6) loss causation. 81 Since the 1970s, Supreme Court
decisions 82 and congressional legislation, including the PSLRA, 83 have
limited Rule 10b-5’s scope. Even as 10b-5 has been actively restricted, the
presumption of reliance standard has remained unchanged since Basic. 84
77. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.
78. See Herman & MacLean, 459 U.S. at 383–84. As Judge Frank Easterbrook
observed in Eckstein, the plaintiffs get a longer statute of limitations under Rule 10b-5 than
under sections 11 and 12 of the Securities Act, but the standard for liability is higher.
Eckstein v. Balcor Film Invs., 8 F.3d 1121, 1123–24 (7th Cir. 1993); see also Black, supra
note 71, at 946 (stating that courts that have adopted a Shores approach “transform a claim
necessarily based on Rule 10b-5 into the equivalent of a section 11 claim”).
79. HAZEN, supra note 6, § 12.3[3], at 526; see supra notes 68–70 and accompanying
text.
80. Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341–42 (2005).
81. See id. Each element must be pleaded with particularity in order to move past
summary judgment. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b); HAZEN, supra note 6, § 12.3[3] (stating that rule
9(b) necessarily applies to Rule 10b-5 claims). Compare to sections 11 and 12(a)(2), which
do not require a showing of reliance or scienter. Herman & MacLean, 459 U.S. at 382
(stating that all that is needed for a prima facie case is a showing that there is a material
misrepresentation or omission and that “[l]iability . . . is virtually absolute, even for innocent
misstatements” whereas fraud requires scienter); see Eckstein v. Balcor Film Invs., 58 F.3d
1162, 1170 (7th Cir. 1995) (stating that reliance need not be shown).
82. See, e.g., Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148
(2008) (limiting liability to all third parties, regardless of their role in fraudulent conduct,
because plaintiffs do not rely on third parties’ conduct); Dura Pharm., Inc., 544 U.S. at 342
(determining that plaintiffs must show loss causation); Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First
Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 185 (1994) (disallowing causes of action
against people who aid and abet); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 214–15 (1976)
(replacing simple negligence with the element of scienter); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 754–55 (1975) (requiring a plaintiff to have either bought or sold the
security affected by fraud).
83. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(6), (b)(1)-(2) (2006)) (limiting class plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees
to a “reasonable percentage” of recoveries and adopting higher pleading standards with
regards to scienter); see also Robert A. Prentice, Stoneridge, Securities Fraud Litigation, and
the Supreme Court, 45 AM. BUS. L.J. 611, 612 (2008) (noting that because of the Supreme
Court’s interpretations since Blue Chip and the PSLRA’s enactment, the “Rule 10b-5 cause
of action actually provides markedly less protection than investors enjoyed before 1934,
rather than more [protection]”).
84. See infra notes 114–26 and accompanying text. Congress could have limited or
eliminated the presumption, but the SEC Chairman, Arthur Levitt, testified in support of
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3. The Reliance Element of a Rule 10b-5 Claim
Courts require reliance 85 because it establishes the causal connection
between a defendant’s fraud, the plaintiff’s decision to buy the security, and
the injury. 86 Thus, reliance proves actual causation.87 To prove reliance in
a Rule 10b-5 claim, a plaintiff must show that the defendant’s
misrepresentation or omission was material 88 and that the misrepresentation
or omission was a substantial factor in the plaintiff’s decision to buy, hold,
or sell the security. 89 The plaintiff’s reliance on the defendant’s
misrepresentation or omission must also be reasonable.90 Even though
reliance is a well-established element of a Rule 10b-5 action, over the years,
courts have recognized that reliance is difficult to prove in class actions.91
Unlike common law fraud, where an action usually involves a few actors
dealing face-to-face, a Rule 10b-5 action “literally involv[es] millions of
shares changing hands daily” between many investors and therefore “Rule
10b-5’s reliance requirement must encompass these differences.” 92 In order
fraud on the market (FOTM). See Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Telecomms. and Fin. of
the H. Comm. on Commerce, 104th Cong. 13 (1995) (testimony of Arthur Levitt, Chairman,
Securities
and
Exchange
Commission),
available
at
http://
www.sec.gov/news/testimony/testarchive/1995/spch025.txt (“An actual reliance requirement
of the type proposed would also make it virtually impossible for investors to assert their
claims as part of a class action.”).
85. Sometimes reliance is referred to as “cause in fact” or “transaction causation.” See,
e.g., Abell v. Potomac Ins. Co., 858 F.2d 1104, 1118 (5th Cir. 1988).
86. List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 463 (2d Cir. 1965) (stating that the aim of
“Rule 10b-5 is to deter misconduct . . . rather than to compensate their victims” and that
therefore reliance ensures that the misrepresentation actually caused the harm). The judicial
requirement of reliance originated from the tort action of deceit. See Black, supra note 71, at
923 n.2 (describing that elements of a Rule 10b-5 action are based in the common law tort
action of deceit and retain many of its characteristics). At common law, because the “great
majority of [deceit] cases” involved misrepresentations between “distrustful adversaries” (or
those at arm’s length), the courts used reliance to prevent the creation of insurance for
injured parties. W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON LAW OF TORTS 726 (5th ed. 1984).
Thus reliance ensured that the fraud itself caused the injury. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 525 (1977).
87. See Black, supra note 71, at 924 (stating that the reliance element establishes
“causation in fact”); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 546 cmt. b. As one court
put it, “[t]o say that a plaintiff relied [on fraud] is to say that the defendant’s actions ‘played
a substantial part in the plaintiff’s investment decision.’” Desai v. Deutsche Bank Sec. Ltd.,
573 F.3d 931, 939 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Rowe v. Maremont Corp., 850 F.2d 1226, 1233
(7th Cir. 1988)).
88. Determining the materiality of an omission or misrepresentation is a fact intensive
question that requires the court to examine whether the omission or statement would have
been considered by a reasonable investor deciding whether to buy or sell a security. Basic
Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231–32, 240 (1988); see also TSC Indus. v. Northway, Inc.,
426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976) (stating a fact is material if a reasonable investor would have
considered the information important in making an investment choice).
89. Ockerman v. May Zima & Co., 27 F.3d 1151, 1158 (6th Cir. 1994).
90. List, 340 F.2d at 462.
91. See, e.g., Basic, 485 U.S. at 243–45 (stating that showing actual reliance during class
certification is impracticable); see also Dennin, supra note 18, at 2617–18 (explaining that
showing actual reliance early in litigation would be “too burdensome”).
92. Basic, 485 U.S. at 243–44; see Joseph De Simone, Note, Should Fraud on the
Market Theory Extend to the Context of Newly Issued Securities?, 61 FORDHAM L. REV.
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to encompass these differences, the court can presume reliance so that
plaintiffs do not have to make the difficult showing of actual reliance for
each of the many individual class members. 93 This also allows judges in
the early stages of litigation to focus on the underlying fraud, the intent of
the actors, and the injury caused.94 However, the presumption is
rebuttable, 95 signifying that defendants can rebut the presumption at trial by
showing that there was no actual reliance.96 Even so, the presumption is
still useful to plaintiff classes because they have less to prove in the early
stages of litigation, including the pivotal class certification stage. 97
4. Class Certification
The importance of whether the presumption is applied cannot be
understated. Application of the presumption often affects whether a class of
investors is certified under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
(Rule 23). 98 In many Rule 10b-5 lawsuits, certification is outcome
determinative. Settlement is more likely when classes are certified, as
defendants would rather pay a settlement than risk an adverse outcome after
trial. 99 Conversely, when the class is not certified, individual plaintiffs are
often compelled to withdraw their claims because the litigation costs for an
individual, or a class action with a small class, outweigh the probable
benefits of prevailing in court. 100
Plaintiffs will generally seek certification 101 under Rule 23(b)(3), which
requires that “questions of law or fact common to class members

S151, S161–68 (1992) (explaining the development of the rebuttable presumption of reliance
in detail).
93. See infra notes 115–24 and accompanying text.
94. See infra Part I.A.6.d.
95. See infra Part I.A.6.d.
96. See infra Part I.A.6.d.
97. See infra Part I.A.4.
98. FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
99. See Patricia Groot, Note, Fraud on the Market Gets a Minitrial: Eisen through In
Re IPO, 58 DUKE L.J. 1143, 1157–58 (2009); see also Malack v. BDO Seidman, LLP, 617
F.3d 743, 755 (3d Cir. 2010) (agreeing that “class certification puts pressure on defendants
to settle claims, even if they are frivolous” (citing In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig.,
552 F.3d 305, 310 (3d Cir. 2008))); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Credit Suisse First
Boston (USA), Inc., 482 F.3d 372, 379 (5th Cir. 2007) (stating that “class certification may
be the backbreaking decision that places insurmountable pressure on a defendant to settle,
even where the defendant has a good chance of succeeding on the merits”) (internal
quotations omitted).
100. See Frederick C. Dunbar & Dana Heller, Fraud on the Market Meets Behavioral
Finance, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 455, 457 (2006).
101. In order for a class to be certified it must also meet the requirements of Rule 23(a),
which states that one or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative
parties on behalf of all members only if:
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; (2) there
are questions of law or fact common to the class; (3) the claims or defenses of the
representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and (4) the
representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
FED. R. CIV. P. 23.

2011]

FRAUD CREATED THE MARKET

1799

predominate over any questions affecting only individual members.”102 If
reliance is presumed, there is no need to show that each individual plaintiff
relied on the misstatement in the same manner until after the class is
certified. 103 Without the presumption, each plaintiff would have to show
how his or her individual reliance was sufficiently similar to every other
plaintiff’s form of reliance in order to be in compliance with Rule 23.104
This makes certification nearly impossible in light of the predominance
requirement because of the expense of compiling the necessary information
and the inevitable differences between class members that would likely
exist. 105 In this way, the presumption of reliance acts as a practical
resolution to these difficulties, allowing for the common questions to
predominate over individual ones under Rule 23(a)(2) and 23(b)(3).106
Without the presumption, defendants would rigorously challenge
predominance during the certification process, 107 which would allow courts
to reject “nearly all proposed securities class actions under the reliance
element.” 108 Therefore, presuming reliance is essential for a class action
suit to proceed. In general, a court will only apply a presumption if certain
criteria are met. The next section discusses these criteria and how, in
common law, courts decide if a presumption should be applied.

102. Id.; see Dunbar & Heller, supra note 100, at 461. Rule 23(b)(3) is intended to
redress monetary damages. See Groot, supra note 99, at 1147 n.28 (explaining that (b)(1)
and (b)(2) were not intended to be used when the primary remedy sought is damages).
103. See Black, supra note 71, at 927–29 (finding that a presumption of reliance does not
eliminate a plaintiff class proving reliance, but removes it from a court’s analysis during the
class certification stage).
104. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 242 (1988) (pointing out that in class action
cases, to require “individualized” proof of reliance from each member in a proposed class
might prevent an action from proceeding because “individual issues” would overwhelm “the
common ones”).
105. See Groot, supra note 99, at 1152; see also Moore v. PaineWebber, Inc., 306 F.3d
1247, 1252 (2d Cir. 2002) (“Class-wide issues predominate if resolution of some of the legal
or factual questions that qualify each class member’s case as a genuine controversy can be
achieved through generalized proof, and if these particular issues are more substantial than
the issues subject only to individualized proof.”).
106. See Basic, 485 U.S. at 242 (arguing that the presumption created “a practical
resolution to the problem of balancing the substantive requirement of proof of reliance in
securities cases against the procedural requisites of [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 23”)
(internal quotations omitted).
107. In re Healthsouth Corp. Sec. Litig., 261 F.R.D. 616, 621 (N.D. Ala. 2009) (stating
the “strongest attack aims at the predominance requirement” regarding reliance).
108. Id.; see Malack v. BDO Seidman, LLP, 617 F.3d 743, 747 (3d Cir. 2010) (explaining
that “[p]roving reliance . . . can quickly become a cumbersome endeavor that overwhelms
the ‘questions of law or fact common’ to the proposed class”); Regents of the Univ. of Cal.
v. Credit Suisse First Boston (USA), Inc., 482 F.3d 372, 394 (5th Cir. 2007) (stating that “no
class may be certified in a § 10(b) case without a classwide presumption of reliance”); see
also Groot, supra note 99, at 1158 n.96 (describing how Congress could have limited class
certification by reversing Basic when it enacted the PSLRA but did not because it would
make bringing a class action near impossible).
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5. The Presumption of Reliance in Rule 10b-5 Actions
Presumptions of certain claims or facts play an important role in judicial
review. 109 Courts and commentators have reasoned that allowing certain
presumptions helps to realize goals of public policy, fairness, and judicial
economy. 110 Such goals are met where difficult-to-prove facts or claims
are assumed, allowing an action to progress toward trial. 111 Courts may
also apply presumptions if they are consistent with “congressional policy”
and “common sense.” 112 Consistent with these goals, the Supreme Court
has extended a presumption of reliance so that courts can focus attention on
whether or not there was a material misrepresentation or omission, if it
caused injury, and whether scienter was present.113
If a plaintiff can show that the other elements have been met, 114 then the
Supreme Court allows a rebuttable presumption that plaintiffs relied on
fraudulent misrepresentations or omissions in two scenarios.115 First, in
Affiliated Ute, the Court granted the presumption in cases involving the
omission of information to investors, if the omitted information was shown
to be material “in the sense that a reasonable investor might have
considered [it] important in . . . making [the investment] decision.” 116 In
this type of case, the net effect is that “materiality and reliance . . . collapse
into one.” 117 The presumption under Affiliated Ute has been widely
accepted and the Supreme Court has rationalized the presumption by
pointing to the inherent unfairness and difficulty a plaintiff would face in
having to prove the counterfactual of “how he would have acted if [the]
omitted material information had been disclosed.”118 However, in cases
that involve a mix of both misrepresentations and omissions, the Affiliated
109. 2 KENNETH S. BROUN ET AL, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 343 (5th ed. 1999).
Presumptions are also useful devices for allocating the burdens of proof between parties. Id.;
FED. R. EVID. 301.
110. Basic, 485 U.S. at 245; see BROUN, supra note 109, § 343 (noting that presumptions
“correct an imbalance resulting from one party’s superior access to the proof”).
111. BROUN, supra note 109, § 343 (“Generally, however, the most important
consideration . . . is probability. Most presumptions have come into existence primarily
because judges have believed that proof of fact B renders the inference of the existence of
fact A so probable that it is sensible and timesaving to assume the truth of fact A until the
adversary disproves it.”); see Basic, 485 U.S. at 245 (expanding the Court’s willingness to
allow a presumption because it is difficult to prove reliance).
112. Basic, 485 U.S. at 245–46; see infra notes 293–99 and accompanying text.
113. See Black, supra note 71, at 934; see also supra note 81 and accompanying text.
114. HAZEN, supra note 6, § 12.10[6].
115. See infra notes 116–21 and accompanying text.
116. Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153–54 (1972). The
Supreme Court found that positive proof of reliance was not the plaintiff’s burden. Id.
Reliance is presumed if the defendant omitted information that it had a duty to disclose, and
that information was material. Id.; see Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 228 (1980)
(explaining that the duty exists where there is a fiduciary or similar relationship of trust
between the parties).
117. Jeffrey L. Oldham, Note, Taking “Efficient Markets” Out of the Fraud-on-theMarket Doctrine After the Private Securities Litigation Act, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 995, 1005
(2003).
118. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 245 (1988); see Oldham, supra note 117, at
1005.
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Ute holding does not apply. 119 In such mixed cases, the plaintiff must
either show actual reliance or obtain the presumption through FOTM.120
FOTM, as held by Basic, allows the presumption of reliance when material
misrepresentations or omissions are disseminated into an efficient
market. 121 In expanding the presumption of reliance to FOTM, the Basic
Court relied on the efficient capital market hypothesis (ECMH), an
economic theory widely accepted at the time. 122 ECMH states that in an
efficient capital market, a misrepresentation or omission will be
incorporated into the price of the security. 123 Since investors use price to
formulate their investment decisions, the Court was therefore willing to
presume that plaintiffs had relied on the misrepresentation.124 Thus, in
order to recover under the Basic standard, the plaintiffs were required to
show that the market for the security they purchased was efficient.125
6. Expanding the Presumption to Efficient Markets
a. Fraud on the Market Under Basic
In Basic, shareholders of Basic Inc. claimed that the company and its
directors issued misleading press releases which “artificially depressed” the
share price. 126 These press releases stated that the company was not
engaged in merger negotiations; 127 however, shortly after their release, the
directors approved the sale of Basic Inc. 128 The plaintiff class had sold
their shares before the board’s endorsement of the sale and claimed to have
been injured by selling at a depressed price.129 In seeking class
certification, 130 the plaintiffs argued the Court should apply FOTM to
create a rebuttable presumption of reliance. 131 A plurality of the Court
agreed with the shareholders, and adopted FOTM, which expanded the
presumption of reliance in Rule 10b-5 actions. 132 Writing for the Court,
119. See Black, supra note 71, at 925. In cases that involve both misrepresentations and
omissions, the plaintiff would have to either show actual reliance, or use the fraud on the
market theory of reliance. Id.
120. Id.
121. Basic, 485 U.S. at 247 (applying the fraud on the market theory of reliance “where
materially misleading statements have been disseminated into an impersonal, well-developed
market for securities”); see infra notes 126–53.
122. See infra note 136; see also De Simone, supra note 92, at S156 (stating that “[t]he
theoretical underpinning of [FOTM] is the [ECMH]”).
123. See infra notes 135–41 and accompanying text.
124. See infra notes 135–41 and accompanying text.
125. See infra notes 138–40 and accompanying text.
126. Basic, 485 U.S. at 228–29.
127. Id. at 227–28.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 228.
130. See supra Part I.A.4.
131. Basic, 485 U.S. at 229–30 (stating that the Court granted certiorari to resolve a split
in the Courts of Appeals regarding this presumption).
132. Id. at 246–50. Prior to Basic, the Court had only recognized the presumption of
reliance in Rule 10b-5 actions in pure omission cases like Affiliated Ute. See supra note 116
and accompanying text.
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Justice Harry A. Blackmun accepted the ECMH theory as a legitimate
theoretical foundation for FOTM. 133
b. The Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis
The ECMH states that in an open134 and well-developed market,135
where information is available and actors are rational, the price of a security
will represent its inherent value. 136 However, if misrepresentations are
material, the price of the security will not match its value. 137 In accordance
with the ECMH, FOTM holds that since investors rely on the price of a
security in deciding whether to buy or sell, it is presumable that the
plaintiffs relied on the fraudulent misrepresentation or omission because the
market digested that information (or lack thereof) into the price.138 Using
this theory, the Basic plurality expanded the presumption of reliance to the
limits recognized by the Court today. 139
c. Relying on Efficiency
In accordance with the ECMH, the Basic plurality stated that a
presumption of reliance can be applied so long as the security trades in an

133. See Basic, 485 U.S. at 246–50. But see id. at 254 (White, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (stating that the Court should not underpin a presumption of reliance
solely on a theory “which may or may not prove accurate upon further consideration”). The
Court’s acceptance of the ECMH and application to FOTM has been widely covered and
accepted by commentators. See, e.g., Daniel R. Fischel, Efficient Capital Markets, the Crash,
and the Fraud on the Market Theory, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 907, 910–12 (1989) (discussing
the validity of the theory); L. Brett Lockwood, Comment, The Fraud-on-the-Market Theory:
A Contrarian View, 38 EMORY L.J. 1269, 1269–70 (1989); De Simone, supra note 92, at
S155–57.
134. “An open market is one in which anyone, or at least a large number of persons, can
buy or sell.” Cammer v. Bloom, 711 F. Supp. 1264, 1276 n.17 (D.N.J. 1989).
135. “A developed market is one which has a relatively high level of activity and
frequency, and for which trading information (e.g., price and volume) is widely available
[and] will almost always be an open one.” Id.
136. See generally Basic, 485 U.S. at 244–47; Fischel, supra note 133, at 911–12. At the
time of FOTM’s adoption, ECMH was widely accepted. See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen, Some
Anomalous Evidence Regarding Market Efficiency, 6 J. FIN. ECON. 95, 95 (1978)
(announcing that “there is no other proposition in economics which has more solid empirical
evidence supporting it”). However, over the years ECMH has been criticized by behavioral
finance commentators that argue, in part, that even in efficient markets price may not reflect
value. See, e.g., Larry E. Ribstein, Forum Article, Fraud on a Noisy Market, 10 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. 137, 138–43 (2006) (stating that markets are “noisy” because market
participants may act irrationally, choosing to buy, sell, or hold without the value of the
security and its underlying assets in mind).
137. See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc, 552 U.S. 148, 159
(2008) (upholding the FOTM).
138. See Basic, 485 U.S. at 244–47; De Simone, supra note 92, at S157. Some courts
find that the Court merely used the word reliance even though no such reliance occurred,
only an effect on the price. See e.g., Eckstein v. Balcor Film Invs., 8 F.3d 1121, 1129 (7th
Cir. 1993).
139. See, e.g., Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 159 (recognizing the ECMH and that FOTM and
the Affiliated Ute presumption are the only times when reliance is presumed).
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efficient market, 140 because “[t]he causal connection between the
defendants’ fraud and the plaintiffs’ purchase of stock in such a case is no
less significant than in a case of direct reliance on misrepresentations.”141
The dissent criticized this position, arguing that people trading in the
market, efficient or not, do not always rely on price to make their
investment decisions, and regularly trade on the belief that stocks are over
or under valued. 142 The dissent found that this presumption was nothing
more than investor insurance, 143 and “effectively eviscerate[d]” the reliance
requirement in contravention of congressional intent. 144 As is commonly
argued by dissenting opinions regarding the expansion of the private right

140. See Basic, 485 U.S. at 244–47. However, Basic “offers little guidance for
determining whether a market is efficient,” Gariety v. Grant Thornton, LLP, 368 F.3d 356,
368 (4th Cir. 2004), and has left each of “the circuits room to develop its own [FOTM]
rules.” Abell v. Potomac Ins. Co., 858 F.2d 1104, 1120 (5th Cir. 1988). One of the most
popular methods of determining market efficiency was established in Cammer, 711 F. Supp.
at 1285–87. Courts apply a multifactor test, known as “Cammer factors” which include:
(1) whether the security has a large weekly trading volume; (2) whether a
significant number of securities analysts followed and reported on the company’s
stock during the applicable period; (3) whether the stock had numerous market
makers; (4) whether the company was entitled to file an S-3 Registration Statement
in connection with public offerings; and (5) whether the security experienced an
historical showing of immediate price response to unexpected corporate events or
financial releases.
In re Healthsouth Corp. Sec. Litig., 261 F.R.D. 616, 632 (N.D. Ala. 2009) (citing In re DVI
Inc. Sec. Litig., 249 F.R.D. 196, 208 (E.D. Pa. 2008); Unger v. Amedisys Inc., 401 F.3d 316,
323 (5th Cir. 2005)). Other courts have also considered additional factors: “[(1)] the
company’s market capitalization; [(2)] the bid-ask spread; [(3)] the float, or issue amount
outstanding excluding insider-owned securities; and [(4)] the percentage of institutional
ownership.” Id. at 632 (citing Unger, 401 F.3d at 323; Bell v. Ascendant Solutions, Inc., 422
F.3d 307, 313 (5th Cir. 2005); In re Scientific-Atlanta, Inc. Sec. Litig., 571 F. Supp. 2d
1315, 1338 (N.D. Ga. 2007); Krogman v. Sterritt, 202 F.R.D. 467, 474, 478 (N.D. Tex.
2001)).
141. Basic, 485 U.S. at 242; see Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,
259 F.3d 154, 175 (3d Cir. 2001) (stating that “[i]n an efficient market the misinformation
directly affects the stock prices at which the investor trades and thus, through the inflated or
deflated price, causes injury even in the absence of direct reliance” (internal citations and
quotation marks omitted)).
142. Basic, 485 U.S. at 252, 256–57 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(commenting that replacing traditional legal analysis “with economic theorization” was sure
to lead to confusion). But as courts and commentators have recognized, price “is the best
indicia of value” which makes truthful pricing free of distortion all the more important. See
Fischel, supra note 133, at 920. Further, even in situations where investors do not believe
price is reflective of the securities value, these same investors will still rely on comparisons
“between [securities] current prices and expected future prices.” Id. Therefore, just like any
investor who believes that price is reflective of value, these investors rely on market to be
free from fraud. Id.
143. Basic, 485 U.S. at 256–57 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
FCTM has also raised the same criticism. See infra notes 221–23, 303 and accompanying
text. But see Fischel, supra note 133, who argues that even if there is effectively a nonrebuttable presumption during class certification it does not create investor insurance
because the presumption only reduces the burden of proof on one element. Plaintiffs must
still establish that the defective disclosure affected the security price and by how much. Id. at
918–19.
144. Basic, 485 U.S. at 258 (arguing that the Exchange Act’s legislative history shows a
clear intent to have reliance be part of the fraud action).
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of action under Rule 10b-5, the dissent asserted that expansion should be
left to Congress. 145 Even so, the plurality found that FOTM, “by
facilitating Rule 10b-5 litigation, supports the congressional policy
embodied in the [Exchange] Act” to provide for a “free and open public
market.” 146
d. Overcoming a Basic Presumption
Importantly, even when the presumption of reliance is granted to a
plaintiff class under Basic’s FOTM theory, a defendant can still defeat the
action by positive proof of non-reliance. 147 This can be done in several
ways. “Any showing that severs the link” between a misrepresentation and
the decision to buy the security would be enough, 148 such as
“demonstrating that a plaintiff, even had he or she known the truthful
information that was not disclosed, would nevertheless still have purchased
the stock at the same price.” 149 Circuit courts have expanded the ability to
overcome the presumption by explaining that if a defendant can show that
the investor “intentionally refused to investigate” a security, or if the fraud
was obvious to the investor and that harm would likely follow, the
presumption is overcome. 150 However, rebutting the presumption is rare
because that would only occur at trial, which generally does not take place
because either the defendants settle, the plaintiffs are not certified, or the
case is dismissed. 151
Since the Basic decision, FOTM has been widely applied by the federal
courts in Rule 10b-5 actions at both the district and circuit court levels.152
But just as courts have willingly embraced the presumption in efficient

145. Basic, 485 U.S. at 256–57; but see Fischel, supra note 133, at 921 (arguing that
adopting FOTM “is judicial legislation only in the sense that all interpretation of Rule 10b-5
is judicial legislation”).
146. Basic, 485 U.S. at 245–46 (plurality opinion) (internal citations omitted). Indeed,
some have argued that FOTM is consistent with the Securities Acts’ goal of disclosure
because it creates greater disincentives to commit fraud and incentives to voluntarily disclose
information to “firms [who] are the lowest cost producers of information.” Fischel, supra
note 133, at 921. Indeed, in a developed market “investors generally rely on a security’s
market price.” Ockerman v. May Zima & Co., 27 F.3d 1151, 1158 (6th Cir. 1994).
Therefore investors indirectly rely on disclosure documents because financial professionals
generally read the disclosure documents when making their decisions to buy and sell, which
“affect[s] the security’s price.” Id.
147. See Keirnan v. Homeland, Inc., 611 F.2d 785, 788–89 (9th Cir. 1980); Black, supra
note 71, at 925.
148. Basic, 485 U.S. at 248. See Black, supra note 71, at 935, for examples of how an
investor could be shown not to have relied on the market’s integrity. One example would be
an investor who sells a security solely to cash out to make a purchase, and does not rely on
the market to make this decision (although Professor Black notes it would be difficult for a
defendant to prove the motives of an individual seller). See Black, supra note 71, at 935.
149. Ballan v. Upjohn Co., 159 F.R.D. 473, 481 (W.D. Mich. 1994) (citing Basic, 485
U.S. at 248–49); see In re Worldcom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 219 F.R.D. 267, 292 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
150. Ockerman, 27 F.3d at 1161.
151. See, e.g., Oldham supra note 117, at 1013 (stating “it is largely recognized that
rebutting the presumption is, in practice, hardly ever done”); see also supra notes 99, 103.
152. See supra notes 131–41.
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secondary markets, they have also been reluctant to apply the presumption
in the IPO context, arguing that it is unjustified under Basic and securities
law. 153
7. Fraud in Inefficient Markets
As much as Basic is the seminal case for FOTM, Shores is the seminal
case for FCTM. 154 In Shores, plaintiff Clarence E. Bishop, Jr. sought to
represent a class of municipal bondholders who had lost millions after the
bond issuer defaulted on its obligations. 155 Bishop had not read the
offering materials but sought to have reliance presumed. 156 The court
determined that the bonds were the product of a scheme to defraud investors
perpetrated by J. C. Harrelson, President of Alabama Supply and
Equipment Company (ASECo), Clarence Hamilton, President of Investors
Associates of America, Inc., and Jerald H. Sklar, bond counsel. 157 The men
“determined to induce the Town of Frisco City to create an Industrial
Development Board to finance ASECo’s [tax-exempt bond] facility as a
scheme to defraud the investing public.”158 Under a local statute, these
bonds could be issued for the development of an industrial plant, which,
once up and running, would capitalize the interest on the bonds. 159
In the application to the city and the offering circular, Sklar, as bond
counsel, omitted information about SEC investigations and ongoing suits
against ASECo and Investor Associates, and included financial information
These
drastically overvaluing ASECo’s and Harrelson’s assets. 160
misstatements and omissions ensured that ASECo would meet the statutory
eligibility requirements to issue municipal bonds. 161

153. See, e.g., In re Initial Pub. Offerings Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d 24, 43 (2d Cir. 2006)
(stating “[i]t is . . . doubtful whether the Basic presumption can be extended, beyond its
original context, to tie-in trading, underwriter compensation, and analysts’ reports” (citing
West v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 282 F.3d 935, 938 (7th Cir. 2002))); Freeman v. Laventhol &
Horwath, 915 F.2d 193, 199 (6th Cir. 1990) (stating “a primary market for newly issued
[securities] is not efficient or developed under any definition of these terms”) (internal
citations and quotation marks omitted); Berwecky v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 197 F.R.D. 65, 68
n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (finding that the “presumption can not logically apply when plaintiffs
allege fraud in connection with an IPO, because in an IPO there is no well-developed
market”). But see generally Robert G. Newkirk, Note, Sufficient Efficiency: Fraud on the
Market in the Initial Public Offering Context, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1393 (1991) (arguing that
applying FOTM to IPOs would further the disclosure goals of securities regulation and that
reliance on the market price of an IPO in many situations is reasonable under the ECMH).
154. Although the Shores court and many subsequent cases did not refer to the theory as
“fraud created the market,” the theory was given this name in Eckstein v. Balcor Film
Investors, 8 F.3d 1121, 1130 (7th Cir. 1993), and has become widely accepted.
155. Shores v. Sklar, 647 F.2d 462, 463–64, 467 (5th Cir. May 1981).
156. Id. at 464.
157. Id. at 465.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. See id. at 466.
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Additionally, the underwriter 162 was aware that these documents were
misrepresentative; 163 the contractor of the plant entered a sweetheart deal
with Harrelson, in which he paid Harrelson for the contract, and the trustee
for the bonds failed to monitor whether or not ASECo defaulted, which it
invariably did. 164 When the default occurred, the value of the bonds
decreased, and the investors, including Bishop, lost significant funds.165
Bishop alleged that he “was the victim of a pervasive scheme to defraud
members of the investing public in violation of the securities laws.” 166 In a
split decision, a narrow majority of the en banc court agreed, holding that a
presumption of reliance could be made under sections (a) or (c) 167 of Rule
10b-5 168 if the fraud was an “intentional scheme[] which deceive[s] or
defraud[s] purchasers of securities.” 169 The court remanded the case
holding that Bishop would have to prove that
(1) the defendants knowingly conspired to bring securities onto the
market which were not entitled to be marketed, intending to defraud
purchasers, (2) [he] reasonably relied on the Bonds’ availability on the
market as an indication of their apparent genuineness, and (3) as a result
of the scheme to defraud, he suffered a loss. 170

The dissent pointed out that this was a new standard that departed from
past precedent and widely held conceptions of actions under Rule 10b-5. 171
Generally, cases involving a misrepresentation or omission in offering
materials would fall under clause (b),172 whereas clauses (a) and (c) were
reserved for instances where the defendant’s actions constituted

162. In general, an underwriter purchases securities from the issuer and then offers to sell
or distribute the security on behalf of the issuer, thereby reducing the issuer’s risk if the
securities do not sell. See HAZEN, supra note 6, § 4.27[1]. Underwriters are commonly used
because “issuers do not have the wherewithal or expertise in the financial industry to market
their shares to a large number of investors” and so issuers use underwriters who have wellestablished distribution networks. Id. at § 2.1(1); see Securities Act of 1933 § 2(a)(11), 15
U.S.C. § 77b(a)(11) (2006) (providing the full statutory definition).
163. Shores, 647 F.2d at 466.
164. Id. at 466–67.
165. Id. at 464.
166. Id.
167. These subsections make it unlawful “(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice
to defraud” or “(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale
of any security.” 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2010).
168. Shores, 647 F.2d at 469.
169. Id. at 472. Importantly, the dissent took issue with this statement, stating that “[n]o
other court has applied clause [a] or [c] of the Rule on the basis of the scale or elaborateness
of the scheme to defraud.” Id. at 486 (Randall, J. dissenting). Rather, “clauses [a] or [c] of
the Rule have been applied instead to cases in which the fraud is not covered by clause [b] of
[Rule 10b-5]” like “total omissions cases, such as [Affiliated] Ute.” Id.
170. Shores, 647 F.2d at 469–70 (majority opinion).
171. Id. at 486 (Randall, J., dissenting).
172. Id.; see Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 476–77 (1977) (stating that
manipulative conduct actionable under (a) and (c) is activity that is designed to artificially
affect the price of a security but does not involve misrepresentations).
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manipulative acts, 173 like stealing money, rather than when the defendants
induced the plaintiff to do something, like buy a security. 174
The basis for the majority’s new interpretation of Rule 10b-5(a) and (c)
was that there is a “distinction between securities that are ‘entitled to be
marketed’” 175 and securities that are not entitled to be marketed.176 Under
this distinction a security that is fraudulently brought to market but could
still be sold, even if at a very low price, would be entitled to be marketed
and would therefore not violate 10b-5(b), whereas a security that, absent the
fraud, could not have been sold at any price would fall under the “not
entitled to be marketed” category and thus the court would apply 10b-5 (a)
or (c). 177 If the security falls under the latter category, then reliance is
presumed if the plaintiff “can show that he reasonably relied on the integrity
of the marketplace to offer him securities that were entitled to be
marketed.” 178 This theory of unmarketability is the foundation for the
different variations of FCTM that exist across the circuits today.
Part I of this Note explained relevant securities law, what reliance is,
when it is presumed, its importance in class actions, and how defendants
can rebut the presumption. Part II examines the diverging views of
Shores’s holding in the circuit courts.
II. SCHEMES TO DEFRAUD AND CREATING LIABILITY IN THE CIRCUIT
COURTS
The Shores version of FCTM enabled plaintiffs to gain the presumption
of reliance when a newly issued security was so rife with fraud that no
investor would have bought the security willingly had the fraud been
disclosed. 179 Shores’s novel approach expanded the presumption of
reliance to schemes to defraud, under clauses (a) and (c) of Rule 10b-5.
This decision departed from the widely accepted view that cases involving
misrepresentations and omissions only fell under clause (b).180 Today the
circuit split consists of three circuits adopting and interpreting Shores’s
elemental approach and expansion of Rule 10b-5(a) and (c), two circuits
rejecting FCTM, and three circuits undecided. Each circuit court’s take on
173. See, e.g., Desai v. Deutsche Bank Sec. Ltd., 573 F.3d 931, 938, 941 (9th Cir. 2009)
(stating clauses (a) and (c) generally apply to manipulative acts that constitute a scheme to
defraud not misrepresentations or omissions).
174. Shores, 647 F.2d at 486 n.23 (citing R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, SECURITIES
REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 1064 (4th ed. 1977)). The dissent explained that (a)
and (c) would apply if the defendant pocketed proceeds from sale, rather than inducing a
plaintiff to invest more money through a misrepresentation, in which case clause (b) would
apply. Id.
175. Id. at 472–73.
176. See id. at 486 (inferring from the majority opinion that if there is an “entitled to be
marketed security,” then there must be a security that is not entitled to be marketed).
177. Id. at 473. In other words, “but for the fraud the securities would have been
unmarketable.” Eckstein v. Balcor Film Invs., 8 F.3d 1121, 1130 (7th Cir. 1993) (internal
quotations omitted).
178. Shores, 647 F.2d at 473.
179. See supra notes 163–75 and accompanying text.
180. See supra notes 172–73 and accompanying text.
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FCTM is discussed below in the following order: first the circuits that have
accepted FCTM, then the circuits that have rejected it, and finally the
undecided circuits.
A. Redefining Unmarketability and FCTM After Shores
The Fifth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits each employs its own standard
for what “not entitled to be marketed” means. 181 The Fifth Circuit uses
economic unmarketability and looks to whether or not the security is
patently worthless. In order for a security to be worthless, the defendants
must have intended to defraud the investing public and the business
underlying the security must be a sham. 182 The Eleventh Circuit applies its
own form of economic unmarketability. It defined “patently worthless” as
when a security could not be offered at any price, meaning that the security
has no resale or liquidation value because it was not backed by underlying
assets. 183 Finally, the Tenth Circuit applies legal unmarketability. This
standard is met when the securities would not have been issued but for the
defendants’ knowing violations of the securities law. 184 Although the
circuits use different standards of unmarketability, all three follow Shores’s
analysis of whether the plaintiffs relied on the integrity of the market and
analyze if this reliance caused injury.
1. The Fifth Circuit
The Fifth Circuit refined FCTM and what “not entitled to be marketed”
means in Abell v. Potomac Insurance Co. 185 Like Shores, Abell involved
municipal bonds that resulted in the loss of millions of dollars to
investors. 186 The plaintiffs brought an action against the project’s
developer and the underwriter’s counsel, 187 claiming that their fraudulent
During class
activities had caused the bond issuer to default. 188
certification, the plaintiff sought to have reliance presumed because
prospective class members had not read the offering materials and therefore
could not show actual reliance. 189 Relying on Shores, the plaintiffs argued
that but for the defendants’ fraud the securities would not have been entitled
to be marketed. 190 The defendants countered that in order for FCTM to
apply under Shores, the securities would have to be worthless, and if they
“retained any value at all” then the theory would not apply. 191 The court
181. See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
182. See infra Part II.A.1.
183. See infra Part II.A.2.
184. See infra Part II.A.3.
185. 858 F.2d 1104 (5th Cir. 1988), vacated on other grounds and remanded sub nom.
Fryar v. Abell, 492 U.S. 914 (1989).
186. Id. at 1112. As of the trial date the bondholders’ total losses were $12,019,118. Id.
187. Id. at 1114–15 (finding that section 12 of the Securities Act did not apply because
neither could be characterized as a “seller” under the Act).
188. Id. at 1115–16.
189. Id. at 1119–20.
190. Id. at 1121.
191. Id.
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disagreed with the defendants’ interpretation of what the Shores opinion
meant by “worthless.” 192 In Shores, bonds had retained some value
because of the underlying assets. 193 Even though the assets gave the Shores
bonds some value, “the sham ‘business’ did not [provide value] because the
promoters never intended to start a legitimate one.”194 In other words, the
bonds may have had some inherent value because assets backed them but
the hoax business was worthless because it could not generate the revenue
to pay interest on the bonds. Therefore, the court held that FCTM only
applied “where the promoters knew that the subject enterprise was
worthless when the securities were issued, and successfully issued the
securities only because of defendants’ fraudulent scheme.” 195 The court
held that the plaintiffs could not rely on FCTM since the bonds “always had
a legitimate value” because the underlying business was not a hoax or
scam. 196 The court therefore determined that the bonds were not patently
worthless 197 and although the defendants engaged in fraud leading to the
eventual default, 198 there was no scheme to defraud investors by starting a
sham business. 199 The Fifth Circuit warned that to hold otherwise would
expand the presumption of reliance too far.200 Soon after Abell was decided
the newly created Eleventh Circuit addressed FCTM.
2. The Eleventh Circuit
In Ross v. Bank South, N.A., 201 the Eleventh Circuit addressed FCTM for
the first time. Sitting en banc, a plurality upheld the Shores theory and
extended the presumption of reliance to a group of bondholders, who had
bought securities in the primary market and would not have been able to
prove actual reliance.202 Extending Shores’s three-part test, 203 the court
recognized that the first element was a substantial hurdle because “the
192. Id. at 1122.
193. Id. at 1121–22.
194. Id. at 1122.
195. Id. at 1122–23. This has become known as economic unmarketability. See Ross v.
Bank S., N.A., 885 F.2d 723, 736–37 n.10 (11th Cir. 1989) (stating that under this standard
marketability does not depend on the value of the bonds but rather on the value of the subject
enterprise and the promoter’s knowledge of that value).
196. Abell, 858 F.2d at 1122 (pointing out that the bonds always had a legitimate value in
the bond market, remaining near market value for several years after Westside disclosed the
accurate version of its beginning and several months after this lawsuit commenced); see also
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Credit Suisse First Boston (USA), Inc., 482 F.3d 372, 391
n.35 (5th Cir. 2007) (reaffirming the Abell’s not entitled to be marketed standard).
197. Abell, 858 F.2d at 1122.
198. See id. at 1111–12.
199. See id. at 1122; see also Shores v. Sklar, 647 F.2d 462, 469–70 (5th Cir. May 1981).
200. Abell, 858 F.2d at 1122.
201. 885 F.2d 723 (11th Cir. 1989); see Newkirk supra note 153, at 1405–06 (stating the
“Fifth Circuit effectively required that a security be entirely worthless before the
[presumption] would apply in the IPO context, a condition that very rarely holds true in real
world situations”).
202. The class of investors had bought bonds without looking at the disclosures. Ross,
885 F.2d at 728–29.
203. See supra text accompanying note 170.
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defendant must have known the securities could not be marketed and must
have brought the securities to market with the intent to defraud.”204 The
plurality found that the plaintiffs failed to make such a showing, and were
not able to show that the fraud was so pervasive as to make the bonds
unmarketable. 205 Unlike Shores where the “misrepresentations went to the
concealment of existing factors vital to the viability of the project, [in this
case] the alleged fraud center[ed] on projections of an uncertain future
occurrence” and the court refused to apply the presumption. 206
In a concurring opinion, Judge Gerald B. Tjoflat found that the fraud met
the Shores standard, but rejected the theory because the Shores holding was
“fundamentally flawed and should be overruled.”207 Perhaps the most
significant part of the concurrence, though, was Judge Tjoflat’s unease with
Shores and the plurality’s attempt to define the “elusive” concept of
“unmarketable.” 208 Judge Tjoflat explained unmarketability could either be
considered “economic unmarketability” or “factual unmarketability.”209
Under economic unmarketability, which Judge Tjoflat stated the plurality
had applied, the question a court must ask is, “[C]ould the [securities] have
been brought onto the market at any combination of price and interest rate if
the true risk of nonpayment had been known?” 210 Judge Tjoflat, as other
courts have pointed out, noted that this standard is near impossible to meet
with bonds because even the most risky bonds can still be sold at some
price. 211 Furthermore, even if the issuer becomes bankrupt, a bondholder
can still seek to recoup some value as a creditor, because “even bonds in
default have a salvage value.” 212 In discussing the unworkability of this
standard, Judge Tjoflat also referred to Abell, in which he stated the Fifth
Circuit had abandoned the economic unmarketability test in favor of a test
that evaluated whether or not the “promoter knew that the subject enterprise
was worthless when the securities were issued.” 213 His opinion noted that
this standard was equally unconvincing for two reasons. First, it would be
impossible for the entities involved in issuing the security to know if it was
worthless. 214 Second, it is unreasonable for an investor to rely on them
because
[a]ll of the parties involved in an issuance have a significant self-interest
in marketing the securities at a price greater than their true value. The
204. See Ross, 885 F.2d at 729–30.
205. Id. at 731.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 733 (Tjoflat, J., concurring). Judge Gerald Bard Tjoflat also wrote that the
Fifth Circuit had “embarked on a path of confusion, and I fear that the majority today only
pushes us farther down that path.” Id.
208. Id. at 735.
209. Id. at 735–36.
210. Id. at 736.
211. Id. at 736; see Eckstein v. Balcor Film Invs., 8 F.3d 1121, 1131 (7th Cir. 1993); see
also infra notes 267–68 and accompanying text.
212. Ross, 885 F.2d at 736 n.8; see also id. at 740 (writing that “to determine when a
security is worthless is nearly, if not completely, impossible”).
213. Id. at 736 n.10 (emphasis omitted).
214. Id. at 740.
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promoter/corporation and the issuer (if a separate entity) have an obvious
interest in marketing the securities regardless of their true fair market
value. Likewise, the bond counsel and underwriter, who are often
retained under a contingency fee contract, are interested in marketing the
securities at an inflated price. The underwriter in particular, who, like an
insurer, can spread the risk of loss among many stock or bond
subscriptions, has a reduced incentive to investigate thoroughly the true
value of the securities it underwrites. 215

Turning to factual unmarketability, Judge Tjoflat found it to be the better
choice of two unreasonable alternatives. Under factual unmarketability, “a
bond is unmarketable if, but for the fraudulent scheme, some ‘regulatory’
entity (whether official or unofficial) would not have allowed the bond to
come onto the market at its actual price and interest rate.” 216 Even if it
would be reasonable for an investor to rely on regulators, overall this
reliance would not be reasonable because one would expect misdealing by
the self-interested actors who bring the bond to market. 217
With these deficiencies in mind, Judge Tjoflat concluded his concurrence
by noting that the theory would be problematic in determining damages and
would have adverse policy implications. Because the investor relies on the
integrity of the market rather than the price, there would be only two
options for assessing damages. The first option would be to award no
damages because the investor had no price on which to rely. 218 This option
clearly contradicts the purpose of allowing the presumption because
damages “would be so nominal as to preclude the bringing of such
suits.” 219 The alternative would be to measure damages by the purchase
price, which the opinion maintains would be unreasonable and against
public policy. 220 It is unreasonable because the investor “had no right to
rely on the issuance price,” and would result in investor insurance, creating
a situation in which “an investor might rationally seek to avoid reading
disclosures in order to preserve a possible claim under Shores.” 221 This
disincentive runs counter to the Exchange Act’s purpose of creating
disclosure. 222 Even if one argues that such damages would cause a greater
level of disclosure, the opinion points to criminal liability, already in place,
to do the job of deterrence. 223
In one of four dissenting opinions, Judge Thomas Alonzo Clark found
that there were triable issues of fact as to whether or not the bonds were
unmarketable. 224 Judge Clark found FCTM viable because Shores
215. Id. But see Newkirk, supra note 153, at 1407 (discussing that it may be reasonable
for shareholders to rely on underwriters “and the IPO process to act as independent judges”).
Further, in IPOs many of the “elements of an active market remain.” Id.
216. Ross, 885 F.2d at 736.
217. Id. at 740; see supra note 215 and accompanying text.
218. Ross, 885 F.2d at 743.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 743–44.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 744 n.23.
224. Id. at 747 (Clark, J., dissenting).
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recognized a “legitimate theory for protecting investors from fraudulently
marketed securities that supplements” the Exchange Act’s policy of
disclosure. 225 Judge Clark’s dissent interpreted the unmarketability theory
under the protections of Rule 10b-5(a) and (c) to mean that “[t]he relevant
inquiry is whether there is any combination of price and interest rate at
which the bonds would have been marketable but for the fraud.” 226 Judge
Clark imagined two situations in which this would occur. First, where, like
the defendants in Shores, “a fraudulent scheme’s sole purpose from its
inception was to swindle investors.” 227 In this type of case the inquiry
would be easy. 228 However, in a case where the “project’s promoters
fraudulently portray an otherwise infeasible project as financially viable in
order to issue unmarketable bonds,” the inquiry is difficult. 229 The dissent
recognized this to be a fact intensive question and therefore would require a
“restrained approach towards granting summary judgment in favor of
defendants.” 230
Although the Eleventh Circuit has not addressed the issue since, the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of Alabama recently relied on the
doctrine in In re HealthSouth Corp. Securities Litigation. 231 The court
found that the presumption of reliance could be applied in the IPO of
corporate bonds because the bonds “could not have been marketed at any
price without the fraud.” 232 As the dissent predicted in Ross, the
determination of whether the bonds were unmarketable was a fact intensive
question, requiring testimony of employees and economists. 233 As one
managing director of UBS testified, the bonds “would never have seen the
light of day” had the fraud been disclosed.234 As the plaintiffs’ expert
witness Timothy A. O’Neill 235 pointed out, the underlying value of the
company (negative $529 million) would ensure that no investor would
purchase a bond for this company given its credit statistics.236 Or in
Shores’s terms, “those bonds could not have been issued at any price . . .
because you actually can’t settle into a known default.” 237 Thus the bonds
were not entitled to be marketed because they were unmarketable.238 Since
the plaintiffs also proved that they reasonably relied on the bonds’
225. Id. at 748.
226. Id. at 750.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 751.
231. 261 F.R.D. 616 (N.D. Ala. 2009).
232. Id. at 642.
233. Id. at 642–44.
234. Id. at 643–44 (“[Timothy A.] O’Neill found no basis in reality for the assumption
that such a large new issuance of distressed company bonds with dramatically deep price
discounts could have been issued to achieve an effective yield high enough to reflect the
HealthSouth credit risk.”).
235. A former Senior Managing Director and former head of the Debt Syndicate
Department at Bear Stearns Co. Id. at 630 n.13.
236. Id. at 644.
237. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
238. Id.
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availability on the market as an indication of their genuineness, and that this
reliance caused the plaintiffs to suffer a loss, which satisfied the last two
elements of Shores and Ross, 239 the court extended the presumption of
reliance and the class was certified.240 Today the Eleventh Circuit’s
interpretation of FCTM, similar to the Fifth Circuit’s, looks at economic
unmarketability. However, the Tenth Circuit has taken an entirely different
approach.
3. The Tenth Circuit
Soon after Shores was decided, the Tenth Circuit accepted FCTM in T.J.
Raney & Sons, Inc. v. Fort Cobb, Oklahoma Irrigation Fuel Authority,241
when it upheld the certification of a class of bond investors, including
members who had not relied on the offering materials. 242 The court
affirmed that investors should be allowed “to assume that the securities
were lawfully issued,” 243 pointing out that FCTM did not create a scheme
of investor insurance. The court reasoned that the theory was a logical
extension of Rule 10b-5’s protection against fraudulent schemes to “cases
in which the securities were not qualified legally to be issued.” 244 This
adaptation of FCTM has come to be known as legal unmarketability. 245
In subsequent cases involving IPO claims, the Tenth Circuit has
continued to uphold this standard, relying closely on Shores and TJ Raney.
In Bank of Denver v. Southeastern Capital Group, 246 the U.S. District
Court for the District of Colorado reiterated that FCTM arises only when
dealing with primary market securities if “a plaintiff shows that but for the
alleged fraud the security would never have been marketed and that the
plaintiff relied on the integrity of the market to produce marketable
securities.” 247 The district court further explained the theory in Alter v.
DBLKM Inc., 248 stating that reliance may be presumed if “the fraud is so
egregious that no investor would have purchased the security if the truth
were known.” 249 The key to legal unmarketability was that without the
defendants’ scheme to defraud, the securities would not have been lawfully
issued and therefore were unmarketable.250
239. See supra notes 168–70 and accompanying text.
240. In re HealthSouth, 261 F.R.D. at 642–45.
241. 717 F.2d 1330, 1333 (10th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1026 (1984).
242. Id. at 1332–34.
243. Id. at 1333 (holding that the class “stated grounds for relief by alleging that the
defendants knowingly conspired to bring unlawfully issued . . . bonds to market with the
intent to defraud, that it reasonably relied on the availability of the bonds as indicating their
lawful issuance, and that it suffered injury resulting from the purchase of the bonds”).
244. Id.
245. Ockerman v. May Zima & Co., 27 F.3d 1151, 1160 (6th Cir. 1994); see Dennin,
supra note 18, at 2629 (stating that legal unmarketability has not been accepted by any other
circuit and is distinct from economic unmarketability).
246. 763 F. Supp. 1552 (D. Colo. 1991).
247. Id. at 1557.
248. 840 F. Supp. 799 (D. Colo. 1993).
249. Id. at 805.
250. Id.
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The legal unmarketability standard adopted by the Tenth Circuit, similar
to the versions of FCTM practiced in the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, has
rarely been applied.251 In fact, among the three circuits only a handful of
plaintiff classes have received the presumption of reliance under FCTM, yet
other circuits have rejected the theory, fearing it would be against public
policy and the intent of the securities laws.
B. Rejecting Shores and FCTM: Policy and Congressional Intent
Just as the circuits embracing FCTM echo the Shores opinion, the
circuits rejecting the theory point to the Shores dissent and Judge Tjoflat’s
concurrence in Ross. The Third Circuit and the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit have rejected FCTM in all of its manifestations,
claiming that the theory lacks any theoretical underpinning, is contrary to
Congress’s intent for the Securities and Exchange Acts and the PSLRA, and
is not supported by the Supreme Court.
1. The Seventh Circuit
In Eckstein v. Balcor Film Investors, 252 Judge Frank H. Easterbrook,
writing for a unanimous Seventh Circuit, addressed whether a plaintiff class
could use FCTM in a primary market context. Two sets of plaintiffs
brought suit against the defendant, Balcor Film Investors (BFI), alleging
that BFI fraudulently omitted facts from offering materials it had issued
under the Securities Act to raise capital for a partnership.253 Using the
supplement and the prospectus, BFI was able to raise $48 million, $13
million over the $35 million needed to meet the partnership requirement to
begin deploying the capital to make movies. 254
The Eckstein plaintiffs had not read the prospectus or the supplement,255
and argued that FCTM entitled them to the presumption of reliance because
without the misrepresentations and omissions in the offering materials, the
$35 million would not have been raised. 256 The court characterized this
argument as asserting a claim based on causation instead of reliance.257
The Seventh Circuit rejected the presumption, insisting that this theory
would remove any legitimate showing of reliance—the necessary link
between the injury and the fraudulent offering materials.258 The court held
that in order for the plaintiffs to recover they would have to prove that each
of the thousands of investors that purchased the securities would have acted
251. See supra Part II.A.
252. 8 F.3d 1121 (7th Cir. 1993).
253. Id. at 1125.
254. Id. at 1123. BFI had been formed by Balcor Entertainment Company, Ltd., to raise
money to make low budget films, which would be produced and distributed by New World
Entertainment, Ltd. Id.
255. Id. The other group called the Majeski Group had read the prospectus and did not
need to rely on FCTM. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 1129–31.
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differently had the prospectus included the negative information and that
the $35 million dollar threshold would not have been met. 259 It appears that
this counterfactual argument—that but for the fraud, the securities would
not have been sold—is not practicable when dealing with the subjective
intent of thousands of investors. 260 However, it has been argued that the
opinion’s reasoning is similar to the legal unmarketability standard,261
because what the court was really asking was: but for the fraud, would the
securities have been legally issued? 262 However, the plaintiffs could not
prove that the investors would not have bought the securities but for the
fraud. 263 Whatever one might call this standard, it is clearly different from
legal unmarketability under T.J. Raney because the court refused to
recognize reliance on the regulatory process.264 The opinion stated that it
was unreasonable for an investor to rely on the regulatory process by which
the bonds were brought to market because the SEC does not engage in
“merit regulation” when it reviews disclosure or registration statements.265
Therefore a security does not reach the market because of the adequacy or
truth of the disclosures. 266
Next, the opinion criticized Shores’s theory of unmarketability, noting
that “[s]ecurities of bankrupt corporations trade freely [and that] some
markets specialize in penny stocks.” 267 Under this viewpoint, the lack of
disclosure may allow the security to be sold at a higher price than its real
value would dictate. But even so, the Shores standard would almost never
be applicable because securities almost always have some worth, even if
only pennies. 268 Yet, the court did not expressly address what would
happen if it were found that the security was indeed worthless. 269
Although the Seventh Circuit has not addressed FCTM outside of
Eckstein and its rehearing, 270 several district courts within the Seventh
259. Id. at 1131.
260. Shon Morgan, Recent Case, Eckstein v. Balcor Film Investors, 8 F.3d 1121 (7th Cir.
1993), 107 HARV. L. REV. 1170, 1175 (1994) (stating that this counterfactual requires
subjective proof from the thousands of investors and that is “substantially less attractive to
plaintiffs”).
261. See Dennin, supra note 18, at 2642.
262. See Eckstein, 8 F.3d at 1131.
263. See id.; see also Morgan, supra note 260, at 1175. The Eckstein case was reheard a
year later by the Seventh Circuit, and again the court did not need to accept or reject the
theory because the plaintiffs did not meet their burden of proof. Eckstein v. Balcor Film
Invs., 58 F.3d 1162, 1170–71 (7th Cir. 1995).
264. See Eckstein, 8 F.3d at 1130–31.
265. Id.; see infra notes 295–99 and accompanying text.
266. Eckstein, 8 F.3d at 1130–31; see HAZEN, supra note 6, § 3.7[2] (stating that the
“SEC does not review the merits of the registration statement and the offering,” instead it
focuses “on the adequacy and clarity of the disclosure . . . and also will conduct a ‘plain
English’ review of those portions of the registration statement that are subject to the SEC’s
plain English disclosure requirements”).
267. Eckstein, 8 F.3d at 1131.
268. Id.
269. See Dennin, supra note 18, at 2642; see infra notes 271–72 (discussing a district
court’s interpretation of Eckstein to allow the presumption of reliance when the security is
worthless).
270. Eckstein v. Balcor Film Invs., 58 F.3d 1162 (7th Cir. 1995).
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Circuit have interpreted Eckstein’s meaning. In Levine v. Prudential Bache
Properties, Inc., 271 the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois understood the Eckstein opinion to leave the door open to finding a
presumption of reliance in a market that was not open and developed.
Levine stated that a plaintiff would need to plead that the “securities would
have been actually excluded from the market” and not just that they would
be sold for less if the fraudulent activity had been disclosed.272 In other
words, that court adopted the economic unmarketability standard developed
in Ross. 273 Thus, only if the securities are worthless can a presumption of
reliance be found in a market that is not open and well developed.274
The same year Levine was decided, the Northern District Court of Illinois
further explained Eckstein’s holding in Endo v. Albertine. 275 The Endo
court held that a presumption could also be applied in the primary market
context if the market for the security in question was “sufficiently
efficient.” 276 Unlike in Eckstein, the market for the securities in Endo
was sufficiently efficient to presume plaintiffs’ reliance based on a fraudon-the-market theory . . . . [because there was] 1) . . . substantial volume
of securities; 2) a large number of investors; 3) the direct involvement of
many underwriters in the offering; and 4) the existence of an impersonal,
national trading market where the price of the [security] is much more
likely to reflect the public availability of information. 277

This holding does not rely on FCTM but rather a new application of FOTM
to efficient primary markets. The factors the court used are the same as
those applied in the secondary market FOTM cases. 278
The Seventh Circuit has not addressed the Levine or Endo holdings, nor
has it elaborated upon Eckstein. The Levine and Eckstein decisions suggest
that if a security were either completely worthless or unissuable but for the
fraud, then perhaps the circuit would allow the presumption of reliance in
narrow circumstances. 279 However, these possible presumptions of reliance
are different than FCTM for three reasons. First, they lack the “scheme to
defraud” element. Second, there is no application of clauses (a) or (c) of
Rule 10b-5 to cases that involve misrepresentations and omissions. And
third, there is no recognition that an investor can rely on the integrity of the
market. 280 The Endo court’s decision also did not accept FCTM. Instead,
Endo applied FOTM to primary markets. 281 There may be some narrow
circumstances where the presumption of reliance can be applied in the IPO
271. 855 F. Supp. 924 (N.D. Ill. 1994).
272. Id. at 933.
273. See supra Part II.A.2.
274. Levine, 855 F. Supp. at 933.
275. 863 F. Supp. 708, 726–27 (N.D. Ill. 1994).
276. Id. (stating that in Eckstein the price of the security was determined solely by the
issuer and the underwriter based on perceived demand).
277. Id. at 726.
278. See supra Part I.A.6.b.
279. See supra notes 259–74 and accompanying text.
280. See supra notes 167–70, 199, 227 and accompanying text.
281. See supra notes 275–78 and accompanying text.
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context within the Seventh Circuit but these presumptions do not rely on
FCTM. Similar to the lower courts in the Seventh Circuit, district courts
within the Third Circuit also displayed a willingness to expand the
presumption into primary markets. 282 However in Malack v. BDO
Seidman, LLP the Third Circuit rejected any application to primary markets
when dealing with misrepresentation and omission cases. 283
2. The Third Circuit
In Malack, the Third Circuit became the most recent court to reject
FCTM. 284 The plaintiffs sought class certification after losing substantial
investments from notes 285 issued by American Business Financial Services,
Inc. (American). 286 The American notes were tied to American’s subprime
mortgage business, and became worthless after the housing market
collapse. 287 American was forced to enter into bankruptcy and was
subsequently liquidated. 288 Malack and the co-plaintiffs alleged that BDO
Seidman, LLP (BDO), an accounting firm that issued clean audit opinions
for American, enabled the notes to be brought to market and meet the
SEC’s registration requirements through fraud. 289 Malack based his
reliance claim on T.J Raney’s legal unmarketability standard, arguing that
but for the fraud, BDO would not have legally been able to issue the
securities 290—without the fraud the securities would not have gained SEC
approval and reached the market. 291 The court rejected FCTM, and even
stated that Malack did not meet the FCTM standard anyway. 292
The Third Circuit was unwilling to accept FCTM for several reasons.
First, the court denied that a presumption of reliance in the primary market
context was justified, referring to the traditional reasons for using a
presumption: “common sense and probability.” 293 The court stated that
common sense “calls for rejecting . . . that a security’s availability on the
market [indicates] its genuineness and is worthy of an investor’s
reliance.” 294 In order to think otherwise there would need to be “some
entity involved in the process of taking the security to market that acts as a
282. See, e.g., Gruber v. Price Waterhouse, 776 F. Supp. 1044, 1052 (E.D. Pa. 1991)
(stating FCTM could apply “where the underlying business is an absolute sham”); see also
Dennin, supra note 18, at 2635–36 (interpreting several district court holdings within the
Third Circuit to support the Eleventh Circuit’s economic unmarketability form of FCTM).
283. 617 F.3d 743, 756 (3d Cir. 2010).
284. Id. at 745. This was a departure from past district court cases within the Third
Circuit, which had accepted FCTM. See supra note 282 and accompanying text.
285. A note, similar to a bond, is a debt security, which promises to pay a certain rate to
the holder. See HAZEN, supra note 6, §1.6[14].
286. See 617 F.3d at 744.
287. Id.
288. Id. at 745.
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. Id. at 748–49.
292. Id. at 756.
293. Id. at 749–52; see supra notes 109–12 and accompanying text.
294. Malack, 617 F.3d at 749.

1818

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79

bulwark against fraud” and that no such bulwark exists because the SEC
“cannot be reasonably relied upon to prevent fraud because it does not
conduct merit regulation.” 295 The SEC only seeks to ensure that the
disclosures are clear and detailed.296 Echoing Judge Tjoflat’s concurring
opinion in Ross, the court also found it against common sense for an
investor to rely on the self-interested parties responsible for bringing the
bonds to market. 297 Thus, filing a registration statement or other regulated
disclosure “with the SEC does not lend any more credibility or veracity” to
the security or its issuer. 298 Therefore, it makes no sense to rely on the
integrity of the market, or that the market is free from fraud. 299
Next, the court rejected probability as a justification for extending the
presumption because the likelihood of a security being legally issued is
greater than being fraudulently issued. 300 Although the court could have
ruled only on the unavailability of FCTM to Malack, Judge D. Brooks
Smith, writing for a unanimous court, chose to reject the theory in its
entirety. 301
The opinion also made several more arguments against FCTM, stating
that unlike FOTM, which is supported by economic theory, FCTM has no
such quantitative or theoretical underpinning. 302 Allowing an investor to
rely on the integrity of the market and assume that financial products are
free from fraud would create investor insurance, 303 undermine the
Exchange Act’s philosophy of disclosure,304 and render the Affiliated Ute

295. Id. at 749–50 (internal quotation marks omitted); see Joseph v. Wiles, 223 F.3d
1155, 1165–66 (10th Cir. 2000) (stating that the “SEC does not read all of the publicly
available information about an offering and then determine the legitimate price for the
security. Nor does [it] endorse any of the documents involved in the issuance of securities”);
supra notes 265–66 and accompanying text.
296. Malack, 617 F.3d at 750 (citing HAZEN, supra note 6, § 3.7[2]); see supra notes 265–
66, 295 and accompanying text.
297. Malack, 617 F.3d at 748–50.
298. Id. at 751 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Joseph, 223 F.3d at 1166).
299. Id. at 748–49. The judge also rejected that issuers would act to ensure the reliability
of their information in order to establish a reputation as an honest dealer because recent
history shows that “[m]any entities . . . forgo the long term benefits of accurate disclosures
for the prospect of short terms gain.” Id. at 750 n.7 (quoting Robert A. Prentice, The
Inevitability of a Strong SEC, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 775, 782 (2006)).
300. Malack, 617 F.3d at 748–52. The court stated that “almost all marketed securities
are, in fact, legally marketable.” Id. at 752.
301. Id. at 756 (“The [FCTM] lacks a basis in common sense, probability, or any of the
other reasons commonly provided for the creation of a presumption.”).
302. Id. at 751 (citing Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 246–47 (1988)).
303. Id. at 751. Quoting the dissent in Shores and Judge Tjoflat’s concurrence in Ross,
the opinion stated that FCTM would allow recovery to investors who do not watch out for
themselves, and the end result would be damages in the amount of the purchase price. Id. at
753; see supra text accompanying notes 219–21.
304. The result of FCTM, the court posited, would be to discourage investors from
reading disclosures and run “contrary to Congress’s goal of empowering investors with the
information they need to make educated, prudent investment decisions.” Id. at 753; see supra
text accompanying notes 221–23.
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and Basic theories of reliance meaningless. 305 Citing Shores, Malack
argued that FCTM would “serve Congress’s goals of promoting honesty
and fair dealings in the securities markets.” 306 This argument did not sway
the Third Circuit, which rejected the notion that section 10(b) could be
expanded “whenever possible to prevent fraud” because securities laws are
not a “catchall for any fraudulent activity committed in connection with a
securities offering.” 307 In support of this argument, the Third Circuit found
that the expansion of reliance would be inconsistent with recent Supreme
Court jurisprudence and the intent of Congress in passing the PSLRA. 308
The Supreme Court pointed to Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First
Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A. 309 and the Court’s most recent reliance
analysis in Stoneridge. 310 In Stoneridge the Supreme Court noted that
Congress could have expanded Rule 10b-5 actions when it passed the
PSLRA but instead “instituted heightened pleading and loss causation
requirements for ‘any private action’ arising from the Securities Exchange
Act.” 311 The Malack Court therefore interpreted Congress’s actions as
seeking to limit section 10(b). 312 In the Third Circuit’s view, even though
Stoneridge did not specifically rule on FCTM, it foreclosed the issue. Just
after describing the two accepted presumptions of reliance set forth in
Affiliated Ute and Basic, the Stoneridge Court stated that the section “10(b)
private right should not be extended beyond its present boundaries.”313
Therefore, accepting FCTM would expand the cause of action under section
10(b) and conflict with both Stoneridge and Congressional intent. 314
The Third Circuit next contended that expansion of the presumption of
reliance would increase the number of frivolous lawsuits before the courts,
which it concluded was squarely against good policy. 315 Expanding
reliance would make IPO’s less attractive to issuers because of the potential
high costs of litigation and the prevalence of strike suits.316 Finally, the

305. Malack, 617 F.3d at 751 n.9 (finding that the FCTM then “could be invoked in any
instance where a security has made it to market,” which would make the Affiliated Ute and
Basic presumptions redundant).
306. Id. at 753.
307. Id.
308. Id. at 753–55; see supra notes 81–83 and accompanying text.
309. 511 U.S. 164, 191 (1994) (holding that a plaintiff is precluded from bringing an
action in aiding and abetting under section 10(b)).
310. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148 (2008).
311. Malack, 617 F.3d at 754 (quoting Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 165–66).
312. Id.
313. Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 165.
314. Malack, 617 F.3d at 752–54; see Desai v. Deutsche Bank Sec. Ltd., 573 F.3d 931,
942 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Stoneridge for the proposition that presumptions in Rule 10b-5
suits should not be applied under new theories).
315. Malack, 617 F.3d at 754–55.
316. Id. at 755 (“[T]hese costs infect the function of the entire securities market, harming
professionals (lawyers, accountants, etc.), the companies they serve, and investors.”); see
supra notes 37–38, 83, 308 and accompanying text.

1820

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79

court noted that this presumption would lead to further settlements of
frivolous class actions. 317
The Malack opinion is the most resounding rejection of FCTM by a
circuit court. However, other circuits, like the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit have criticized the theory without specifically rejecting
it. 318
3. The Sixth Circuit
In Ockerman v. May Zima & Co 319 the defendants sold municipal bonds,
which had been approved by the City of Bowling Green, Kentucky, for the
purpose of constructing a retirement village. 320 The revenue generated
from this project would pay the bond interest, but not a single habitation
was ever rented or sold. 321 The defendant, Zima, was responsible for a
financial study that was included in the offering materials detailing the
potential profitability of the retirement community. 322 Zima had reason to
believe the project might fail for various reasons but did not include this
information in the report. 323 Meanwhile, the promoters of the project,
Thomas Hunter and Bryson Hill, also had reason to believe the project
would not succeed. 324 In furtherance of their effort to gain municipality
approval, Hill, who marketed himself as the “money man,” misrepresented
his own financials and projections for the success of the retirement
community. 325 After the bond issuance, Hill filed for bankruptcy and the
bonds were declared in default. 326 The plaintiff, who had read the bond
offering materials moved to certify a class, and urged the court to accept
FCTM so that the other plaintiffs who had not relied on Zima’s fraud could
be included. 327
Ruling for the defendants, the court rejected the claim that FCTM was
applicable in this case. After reviewing the principles of economic
unmarketability328 and legal unmarketability, 329 the court held that the
plaintiffs could prove neither that the bonds were worthless 330 nor that “had
317. Malack, 617 F.3d at 754–55 (opining that “[r]ewarding frivolous actions with
settlements is clearly undesirable”).
318. See infra Part II.B.3; see also Herzog, supra note 14, at 383 (“The Sixth Circuit
declined to state affirmatively whether it would adopt or reject [FCTM]. . . .”).
319. 27 F.3d 1151 (6th Cir. 1994).
320. Id.
321. Id. at 1153.
322. Id.
323. Id.
324. Id. at 1153–54.
325. Id. For instance the circular stated that the retirement community would be equipped
with kitchens and a full time nurse, which the defendants were aware was impossible for
various reasons. Id. at 1154.
326. Id.
327. Id. at 1154–55.
328. See supra notes 195, 208–17 and accompanying text.
329. See supra text accompanying notes 217–23.
330. Ockerman, 27 F.3d at 1160 (stating that the retirement community “was developed
and later sold, although at a substantial loss”).
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full disclosure been made, the governmental entity would have been
required by law to deny the bonds’ issuance.” 331
The Sixth Circuit determined that the district court’s finding that Rule
10b-5(a) and (c) 332 could “permit the court to presume that a purchaser
relied on the integrity of [the] defendants’ scheme or course of business in
issuing the securities” was erroneous. 333 The Sixth Circuit did not address
section (c), 334 but did discuss section (a). Since the plaintiff could not point
to “any devise, scheme or artifice to defraud” other than the offering
circular, the court held that subsection “(a) [did] not appear to contribute
anything not contained in subsection (b).” 335 The court emphasized that to
apply section (a), as the district court and Shores had done, in a fraud case
that only includes misrepresentations, would create a form of investor
insurance, which would contravene the Exchange Act policy to promote full
disclosure. 336 The court reasoned that to interpret section (a) differently
would run contrary to Basic and Congress’s intent, effectively eliminating
the reliance requirement and creating “a new implied cause of action which
amounts to investor’s insurance.” 337 In concluding its discussion of the
theory, the court chose to neither reject nor accept the theory because it was
inapplicable.338
The circuit split surrounding FCTM has continued to develop since
Shores first put forward the theory over thirty years ago. 339 As it now
stands, there are three circuits that have acknowledged versions of the
theory, and two circuits that reject FCTM. Interestingly, all sides of the
split claim to advance a position they find best fits with public policy and
congressional intent regarding the primary securities market. Part III of this
Note focuses on the validity of the varied reasons underlying the different
courts’ positions. Furthermore, it argues that the Fifth Circuit’s position in
Abell best embodies Congress’s intent and furthers public policy.

331. Id.
332. See supra note text accompanying 77.
333. Ockerman, 27 F.3d at 1161–62.
334. Presumably the court did not address section (c) because the defendants did not
create the business to steal from public, as the defendants in Shores had.
335. Ockerman, 27 F.3d at 1161.
336. Id. at 1161–62.
337. Id. at 1162; see Dennin, supra note 18, at 2639 (stating that the court was concerned
that following the district court would result in removing reliance completely from Rule 10b5(a) and (c) actions).
338. Ockerman, 27 F.3d at 1161 (“[W]e neither adopt nor reject that theory since to do so
would be advisory.”).
339. The Eighth and Ninth Circuits have also declined to adopt or reject the theory. See
Desai v. Deutsche Bank Sec. Ltd., 573 F.3d 931, 942 (9th Cir. 2009) (stating that if the
theory was viable it did not apply to the facts of the case); In re NationsMart Corp. Sec.
Litig., 130 F.3d 309, 322 (8th Cir. 1997) (writing that “even if this [c]ourt were to accept the
[FCTM], the plaintiffs do not allege [sufficient] facts”).
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III. FRAUD CREATED THE MARKET SHOULD BE ACCEPTED IN THE
PRIMARY SECURITIES MARKET
Several circuit courts have embraced FCTM because it allows investors
to rely on U.S. markets to produce securities that are not intended to
defraud the investing public. The Tenth Circuit applies the legal
unmarketability standard, while the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits have
adopted some form of economic unmarketability. 340 The Sixth Circuit and
U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Eighth and Ninth Circuits are still
undecided. 341 The Seventh Circuit has refused to adopt FCTM, but in
narrow situations it allows the presumption of reliance in the new issue
context. 342 Finally, the Third Circuit has completely rejected any
presumption of reliance in the new issue context (except in pure omission
cases). 343 The Third Circuit’s firm rejection of FCTM has widened the
split further, making this issue ripe for the Supreme Court to address. The
Supreme Court should adopt the economic unmarketability standard
established in Abell, because it is supported by congressional intent, and
reject both the Eleventh Circuit’s adaptation in Ross and the Tenth Circuit’s
legal unmarketability standard.
A. The Correct Interpretation: The Abell v. Potomac Version of FCTM
Should Be Adopted
The Supreme Court should adopt the Fifth Circuit’s version of FCTM as
articulated in Abell. Abell’s holding proffers the best form of the theory
because it expands the presumption of reliance consistent with
congressional intent, public policy, common sense, and probability. This
version of FCTM allows courts to punish defendants who have engaged in
schemes to defraud, while limiting plaintiff recovery to instances when the
fraud is so egregious that no investor would have willingly purchased the
security had all the information been available. 344
In order for the court to apply the presumption under Abell’s theory of
economic unmarketability, a proposed plaintiff class must show that the
business underlying the security is a sham. 345 As illustrated by the Fifth
Circuit’s decision, this presumption is difficult to obtain because the fraud
must be knowingly perpetrated to an extensive degree. 346 Many of the
parties involved in issuing the securities in Abell made misrepresentations,
broke state laws, and generally conspired to defraud the local government
and potential investors. 347 However, the court would not extend the
340. See supra Part II.A.1–II.A.3.
341. See supra Part II.B.3.
342. See supra Part II.B.1.
343. See supra Part II.B.2.
344. See supra notes 194–99 and accompanying text; see also Dennin, supra note 18, at
2644–45 (arguing that Abell is the best standard because it focuses on the issuer’s intent and
whether the issuer intended to “perpetrate a complete sham”).
345. See supra notes 194–99 and accompanying text.
346. See supra text accompanying note 194.
347. See supra notes 186–99 and accompanying text.
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presumption of reliance because the issuers planned to create a functioning
business rather than a sham. 348 By allowing investors to recover only in
cases involving a hoax business, Abell’s version of FCTM punishes an
egregious form of securities fraud while protecting issuers from meritless
suits. 349
These inherent limitations on FCTM’s application are also consistent
with federal securities laws. Both the Securities and Exchange Acts were
passed in order to protect investors and increase disclosure so that the
securities markets could be free of fraud. 350 Abell’s version of FCTM is
consistent with these goals because it provides investors in the primary
market—who otherwise would have no cause of action under the Securities
or Exchange Act—a chance to recover when fraud has been committed.351
Without an opportunity to have reliance presumed, albeit narrow, investors
who purchased exempted securities on the primary market cannot bring an
action without actual reliance, an almost insurmountable barrier to
certification.352 Furthermore, FCTM’s presumption does not conflict with
Congress’s intent concerning the reliance element. Legislators who passed
the Securities and Exchange Acts “did not have a pervasive intent to require
plaintiffs under the securities laws to read or rely specifically on a
prospectus or circular.” 353 Additionally, section 10(b) of the Exchange Act
was meant to be read flexibly in order to restrict deceptive practices in
securities markets, just as it was read when the Court first recognized a
presumption of reliance in Affiliated Ute and expanded the presumption to
FOTM in Basic. 354
Importantly, there does not appear to be any evidence that FCTM is
inconsistent with the PSLRA. The PSLRA was passed to insulate
defendants from strike suits in order to keep frivolous litigation costs to a
minimum. 355 To meet this goal, Congress increased the pleading standards

348. See supra notes 195–200 and accompanying text.
349. See supra notes 195–200 and accompanying text.
350. See supra notes 50–52, 72–80, 146 and accompanying text.
351. See supra notes 67–71 and accompanying text.
352. See supra notes 91–93, 98–108 and accompanying text.
353. Shores v. Sklar, 647 F.2d 462, 470 n.7 (5th Cir. May 1981) (stating that section 11 of
the Securities Act “allows recovery for [omissions and misrepresentations] in [a] registration
statement without proof of reliance”). Since the Securities Act and Exchange Acts were
passed with the same goals in mind, section 11 indicates that the reliance element is not set
in stone. Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 578 (1995) (stating that “[i]t is
understandable that Congress would provide buyers with a right to rescind, without proof of
fraud or reliance, as to misstatements . . . in the context of a public offering by an issuer or
its controlling shareholders”); Shores, 647 F.2d at 470 n.7. Interestingly, at least one
commentator has suggested that Congress could expand the remedies of section 11 so that it
would encompass securities or participants exempted by the Securities Act, thereby
eliminating the need for FCTM. See Black, supra note 71, at 955.
354. See supra notes 73, 113–21 and accompanying text; see also Santa Fe Indus. v.
Green, 430 U.S. 462, 475–76 (1977) (stating that section “10(b) must be read flexibly, not
technically and restrictively” so that plaintiffs who suffer injury as a result of securities fraud
can recover) (citation omitted).
355. See supra notes 33–38 and accompanying text.
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for scienter. 356 Congress could have reversed the Affiliated Ute or Basic
presumptions of reliance but it did not. In fact, an earlier version of the Act
included a provision seeking elimination of Basic’s presumption but it was
rejected.357 This suggests that Congress supports presumptions of reliance
because they are necessary to Rule 10b-5. Further, FCTM is consistent
with the PSLRA’s intention to prevent unnecessary litigation costs because
attorneys would only bring an action under FCTM in very limited
circumstances, where the security is exempt from the Securities Act and the
fraud is so extensive it meets Abell’s standard. 358
One could argue that there is no need for FCTM because issuers “benefit
when [they] develop[] a reputation for disclosing accurate information to
investors.” 359 Yet it has become clear in recent history that firms do not act
as honestly as once thought, and increasing liability may be necessary in
order to protect markets from fraud. 360 Indeed, the FCTM presumption is
consistent with the view that securities markets should be free from heavy
regulation because it would rarely be applicable.
This version of FCTM should be accepted because it meets both common
sense and probability. FCTM is supported by common sense because it is
reasonable for an investor to expect that, regardless of its profitability,
newly issued securities’ offering documents are not one long laundry list of
misrepresentations written with the intent of stealing from the public. The
Malack court contended that reliance on the integrity of the market did not
meet the common sense requirement because there is no regulatory agency
or actor that operates as a bulwark against fraud.361 Although the Malack
decision is correct that no such agency exists and that actors bringing a
security onto the market are self-interested, the Third Circuit too quickly
dismissed the honesty of the financial industry as well as the immensity and
type of fraud required by Abell. An investor may reasonably expect that a
limited degree of misrepresentation will occur during the IPO process.
However, it is unreasonable to expect that financial professionals will either
negligently or knowingly overlook an entirely bogus enterprise.362
Therefore, common sense is a question of degree and it is reasonable for
investors to expect that sham businesses will not be capitalized and sold on
the market.

356. See supra text accompanying note 311.
357. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
358. This is because a plaintiff would bring an action under the Securities Act if possible
because the standard is negligence, a far lower burden of proof than Rule 10b-5’s scienter
requirement. See supra notes 65–66, 81 and accompanying text.
359. See Prentice, supra note 299, at 781; see Malack v. BDO Seidman, LLP, 617 F.3d
743, 750 n.7 (3d Cir. 2010) (mentioning that the long term benefits of honest disclosure
prevents fraud).
360. Malack, 617 F.3d at 750 n.7 (stating that many issuers after short term gain forego
the long term benefits of honest disclosure); see, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., What Caused
Enron? A Capsule Social and Economic History of the 1990s, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 269,
269–72 (2004).
361. See supra notes 265–68, 295–96 and accompanying text.
362. Most securities are issued without fraud. See Malack, 617 F.3d at 748–49, 752.
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Additionally, FCTM is justified by probability. The likelihood of fraud
being uncovered under Rule 10b-5 claims through use of FCTM is high,
even if the security turns out to be marketable. In most of the decisions
analyzed in Part II, there was some type of fraudulent misrepresentation.363
This high rate of fraud was, in part, a product of the high burden imposed
by FCTM. Without a convincing argument that fraud occurred, it would be
foolish to bother litigating a claim on FCTM. The Malack opinion rejected
the argument that probability justifies FCTM, contending that there is a
higher probability that a security will be issued legally than not.364 This
argument misses the point. The pertinent question is what percentage of
FCTM claims are actually a product of fraud. Abell’s high burden of proof
alleviates this concern because it ensures a high probability that fraud was
committed. 365
Although imposing FCTM could lead to a higher number of successful
class certifications, it will not create investor insurance. The combination
of the PSLRA’s higher pleading standards and the unmarketability element
established in Abell make pleading a prima facie case of FCTM highly
burdensome. 366 Even if the number of classes receiving certification were
to increase, FCTM is justified as a means to preserve the intent of securities
laws. Though some innocent defendants may choose to settle or may incur
extraneous legal costs, on the whole, the law will promote disclosure and
investor protection, and only Abell’s iteration of FCTM can meet these
ends. 367
B. The Tenth and Eleventh Circuits’ Interpretation of FCTM Should Be
Rejected
The forms of FCTM that have been accepted by the Tenth and Eleventh
Circuits should not be adopted. The Tenth Circuit’s legal unmarketability
standard should be rejected because it is unreasonable for investors to rely
solely on the SEC, which does not engage in merit regulation, to prevent
fraudulent misrepresentations in IPOs. 368 When a security is issued, the
SEC reviews the offering documents to ensure that the disclosures meet
various regulations. 369 However, it does not investigate whether these

363. See supra Part II.
364. See supra note 300 and accompanying text.
365. See supra text accompanying note 363. The Securities Act contributes to this
likelihood because any case that is not exempt will likely result in an action under section
11, which has the lower negligence hurdle as compared to scienter under Rule 10b-5. See
supra notes 64–66 and accompanying text.
366. Further, investor insurance is an exaggerated critique of FCTM because the
presumption is rebuttable. The defendants only have to show at trial that the plaintiff class
did not actually rely on the fraud in the offering materials. In cases where the defendants are
innocent, they will always have a chance to prevail.
367. See Dennin, supra note 18, at 2642–47 (explaining that the Fifth Circuit’s
application of FCTM should be accepted because it is in accord with the Exchange Act’s
purpose and does not create investor insurance).
368. See supra notes 265–66, 295–96 and accompanying text.
369. See supra notes 265–66, 295–96 and accompanying text.
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disclosures are true. 370 Therefore, it does not meet the common sense
requirement for an investor to rely on the SEC to prevent
misrepresentations and omissions in the offering documents. 371 In addition,
legal unmarketability is too expansive and would result in investor
insurance. 372 Unlike Abell, the T.J. Raney standard of unmarketability
would encourage investors to bring a strike suit anytime a misrepresentation
was made knowingly. Thus, this standard is contrary to the PSLRA’s intent
and should not be adopted. Similarly, the Court should reject the Ross
standard of economic unmarketability because it inappropriately relies on
the value of the security. 373 Since the purpose of FCTM is to prevent fraud
and protect investors, it makes more sense to analyze the fraud rather than
the security’s value. Further, Ross’s standard of unmarketability is too
narrow, because even the most worthless securities have some resale
value. 374 Therefore, in a situation like Shores where every actor involved
in the IPO knowingly engaged in illegal activity, FCTM would not apply
because the Shores bonds had scant underlying assets. 375 The Ross
standard may prevent unnecessary litigation successfully, as mandated by
the PSLRA, but it is under inclusive to the point of protecting the
perpetrators of fraud rather than its victims.
CONCLUSION
The application of FCTM has been a controversial method of presuming
reliance in Rule 10b-5 actions since Shores first announced it over thirty
years ago. In that time, the Fifth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have
adopted various approaches, including legal unmarketability and two
distinct versions of economic unmarketability. Most recently, the Third
Circuit joined the Seventh Circuit in rejecting the theory. Of these
interpretations, the Fifth Circuit’s position in Abell is the most compelling.
Its application of FCTM provides investors with a much-needed avenue of
redress without needlessly expanding the presumption of reliance. With
this in mind, the Supreme Court should adopt the Abell standard and give
investors protection against flagrant forms of fraud.

370. See supra notes 265–66, 295–96 and accompanying text.
371. See HAZEN, supra note 6, § 3.7[2] (stating that “[t]he SEC does not review the merits
of the registration statement and the offering” rather it looks for “sufficient detail and with
sufficient clarity” in the materials).
372. See supra note 303 and accompanying text.
373. See supra Part II.A.2.
374. See supra notes 211–12 and accompanying text.
375. See supra notes 211–12 and accompanying text.

